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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
The thesis examines the viability of the ‘critical mass’ approach to negotiations as a proper
substitute for conventional negotiating formats in present and future World Trade Organization
(WTO) trade negotiations. The thesis provides an overview of the traditional negotiating formats
in the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT
1947). A case study approach is adopted in the thesis to explain the concept of the critical massbased negotiating modality in the WTO context. The primary case studies are the existing WTO
Information Technology Agreement, the WTO Basic Telecommunication Agreement, the
Reference Paper, the WTO Financial Services Agreement, and the projected WTO Agreement on
Fisheries Subsidies. The thesis concludes that due to various requirements implicit in its model,
the ‘critical mass’ technique may not be a suitable substitute negotiating format for every present
and future WTO trade negotiation.

Keywords: World Trade Organization, Critical Mass Agreement, Joint Statement Initiatives,
Information Technology Agreement, Basic Telecommunication Agreement, Reference Paper,
Financial Services Agreement, Fisheries Subsidies.

i

SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, which succeeded the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs of 1947 (GATT 1947), was concluded in 1994. The WTO Agreement’s
institutional form took shape in the WTO as an international organization that administers the
regulation of trading activities between member states. The WTO Agreement replicates most of
the GATT 1947 but is silent as to the method by which trade negotiations are to be conducted.
Some of the methods that have been used effectively require unanimous or near-unanimous
approval, causing problems in the ability of the WTO membership to negotiate or extend
successful trade agreements over the years. As a result of institutional paralysis partly caused by
traditional negotiating modalities, the ‘critical mass’ approach has been suggested as a possible
way forward for present and future WTO negotiations. Through case study analysis, this thesis
examines to what extent a critical mass-based approach to trade negotiations can apply and be
useful in the WTO negotiating context generally. The thesis concludes that due to various
requirements implicit in its model the ‘critical mass’ approach may not be a suitable substitute
negotiating format for every present and future WTO trade negotiation.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am thankful to God almighty for His unconditional love for me in every way and helping me to
complete this thesis.
My sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Chi Carmody, for his patience, unwavering
support, guidance, and encouragement throughout this journey. I am also grateful to The
University of Western Ontario, particularly the Faculty of Law for its financial support and
opportunity to complete this thesis.
I want to thank my amazing parents (Mr. and Mrs. Adeyemi), ever supportive siblings (Oluwaseyi
Adejuwon and Olayemi Adeyemi), and all family members that supported me in different roles
throughout the course of this thesis.
I am grateful to all my friends and loved ones for their continuous support and encouragement. I
cannot mention you all but I appreciate all of you. God bless you all.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS ................................................................................................. i
SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE .......................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... ix
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background to the Study ....................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Problem Statement .............................................................................................................. 10
1.3 Research Objective ............................................................................................................. 12
1.4 Scholarly Contribution ........................................................................................................ 13
1.5 Research Methodology ....................................................................................................... 13
1.6 Thesis Structure/Organization of Chapters ......................................................................... 14
2. THE WTO – BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATIONS .................................................... 16
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 16
2.2 The Emergence of GATT 1947 .......................................................................................... 16
2.2.1 The International Trade Organization .......................................................................... 17
2.2.2 The GATT 1947 ........................................................................................................... 20
2.3 GATT 1947 Negotiating Techniques.................................................................................. 22
2.3.1 Pre-Kennedy Round ..................................................................................................... 22
2.3.2 The Kennedy Round .................................................................................................... 23
2.3.3 The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) ................................................................................... 27
2.3.4 The Uruguay Round ..................................................................................................... 31
2.3.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 31
2.3.4.2 The UR Negotiations ............................................................................................ 32
2.3.4.3 The UR Negotiating Modalities ............................................................................ 33
2.4 The World Trade Organization ........................................................................................... 35
2.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 35
2.4.2 The Consensus Principle .............................................................................................. 36
2.4.3 The WTO Negotiating Modality.................................................................................. 38
2.5 Features of the Multilateral Trading System ...................................................................... 39
iv

2.5.1 Non-Discrimination ..................................................................................................... 40
2.5.1.1 Most-Favoured Nation .......................................................................................... 40
2.5.1.2 National Treatment ............................................................................................... 41
2.5.2 Special and Differential Treatment .............................................................................. 41
2.6 The Doha Development Agenda ......................................................................................... 43
2.6.1 Description of the Doha Development Agenda ........................................................... 43
2.6.2 Post-Doha Development Agenda Declaration ............................................................. 44
2.6.3 The Doha Development Agenda Round Negotiating Modality .................................. 46
2.6.4 The Single Undertaking Principle ................................................................................ 46
2.7 WTO Joint Statement Initiatives ......................................................................................... 48
2.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 53
3. THE CONCEPT OF 'CRITICAL MASS' IN WTO NEGOTIATIONS ........................... 55
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 55
3.2 Difference between a CMA and other Forms of WTO Trade Agreements ........................ 55
3.2.1 Multilateral Trading Agreements ................................................................................. 56
3.2.2 Plurilateral Agreements (PAs) ..................................................................................... 57
3.2.3 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) ....................................................................... 58
3.3 Status of a CMA in the WTO ............................................................................................. 58
3.4 What is the 'Critical Mass' Threshold? ............................................................................... 60
3.5 Features of a 'Critical Mass' Negotiating Approach ........................................................... 61
3.5.1 Whether assembling a 'critical mass' is possible .......................................................... 61
3.5.2 Whether there is a "champion" country willing to use the threat of market closure or
other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members ............................ 62
3.5.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high enough and commands adequate
institutional power in the concerned trade sector ................................................................. 63
3.5.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential ............................................ 66
3.6 ‘Critical Mass’ Approaches in Previous WTO Agreements ............................................... 68
3.6.1 The WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) ................................................ 68
3.6.1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 68
3.6.1.2 Description of the WTO ITA Negotiation Process ............................................... 68
3.6.1.2.1 The UR ITA Negotiation ............................................................................... 68
3.6.1.2.2 Post-UR ITA Negotiation .............................................................................. 69
3.6.1.2.3 Post-ITA Negotiation Process........................................................................ 74
v

3.6.1.3 The ITA as a CMA ............................................................................................... 75
3.6.1.3.1 Whether assembling a 'critical mass' is possible. ........................................... 75
3.6.1.3.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market
closure or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.... 76
3.6.1.3.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate
institutional power in the concerned trade sector ......................................................... 76
3.6.1.3.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential .............................. 78
3.6.2 WTO Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA) ................................................... 79
3.6.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 79
3.6.2.2 Description of the WTO BTA Negotiation Process ............................................. 80
3.6.2.2.1 The UR BTA Negotiation .............................................................................. 80
3.6.2.2.2 Post-UR BTA Negotiation ............................................................................. 83
3.6.2.3 The BTA as a CMA .............................................................................................. 87
3.6.2.3.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible .......................................... 88
3.6.2.3.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market
closure or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.... 88
3.6.2.3.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate
institutional power in the concerned trade sector ......................................................... 89
3.6.2.3.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential .............................. 91
3.6.3 The WTO BTA Reference Paper ................................................................................. 91
3.6.3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 91
3.6.3.2 Description of the Reference Paper Negotiation Process ..................................... 92
3.6.3.3 Legal Status of the Reference Paper ..................................................................... 94
3.6.3.4 Analyses of the Reference Paper .......................................................................... 95
3.6.3.5 The Reference Paper as a CMA ............................................................................ 96
3.6.3.5.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible .......................................... 96
3.6.3.5.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market
closure or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.... 97
3.6.3.5.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate
institutional power in the concerned trade sector ......................................................... 97
3.6.3.5.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential .............................. 99
3.6.4 The WTO Financial Services Agreement (FSA) ....................................................... 100
3.6.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 100
3.6.4.2 Description of the WTO FSA negotiation .......................................................... 101
vi

3.6.4.3 Post-UR FSA Negotiation .................................................................................. 103
3.6.4.4 The FSA as a CMA ............................................................................................. 108
3.6.4.4.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible ........................................ 108
3.6.4.4.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market
closure or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.. 109
3.6.4.4.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands institutional power
in the concerned trade sector....................................................................................... 110
3.6.4.4.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential ............................ 111
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 112
4. 'CRITICAL MASS' IN WTO NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING FISHERIES
SUBSIDIES................................................................................................................................ 113
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 113
4.2 What is Subsidy?............................................................................................................... 114
4.3 Why is the WTO the right forum for AFS Negotiations? ................................................. 114
4.4 Inadequacy of the ASCM vis-a-vis Fisheries Subsidies. .................................................. 117
4.5 Description of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations .............................................. 118
4.5.1 Pre-Doha Round Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines ........................... 118
4.5.2 Doha Round Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations .......................................................... 119
4.5.3 Post-Doha Fisheries Subsidies Negotiation ............................................................... 120
4.5.4 Post- 2015 WTO AFS Negotiating Approach ........................................................... 124
4.5.4.1 Prohibition of IUU Fishing ................................................................................. 124
4.5.4.2 Prohibition of Overfished Stocks ........................................................................ 126
4.5.4.3 Prohibition of Overfishing and Overcapacity ..................................................... 126
4.6 Limitations to the Successful AFS Negotiation in the WTO ............................................ 128
4.7 A 'Critical Mass' Approach to the AFS ............................................................................. 132
4.7.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible. ..................................................... 132
4.7.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure or
other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members. ......................... 133
4.7.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate institutional power
in the concerned trade sector............................................................................................... 135
4.7.3.1 Imprecise Determination of Necessary Participants for ‘Critical Mass’ ............ 136
4.7.3.2 Fish as a Common Resource ............................................................................... 137
4.7.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential .......................................... 138
4.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 140
vii

5. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 142
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 149
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 179
CURRICULUM VITAE........................................................................................................... 192

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACP

African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AFS

Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

BRIC

Brazil, Russia, India and China

BTA

Basic Telecommunication Agreement,

CMA

Critical Mass Agreement

CTE

Committee on Trade and Environment

CPT

Consumer Project on Technology

DDA

Doha Development Agenda

DG

Director-General

EC

European Communities

EU

European Union

FOGS

Functioning of the GATT System

FSA

Financial Services Agreement

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GATS

General Agreement on Trade in Services

GBT

Group on Basic Telecommunications
ix

IISD

International Institute for Sustainable Development

IPOA-IUU

International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing

IT

Information Technology

ITA

Information Technology Agreement

ITO

International Trade Organization

LDC

Least-Developed Country

MC

Ministerial Conference

MFN

Most-favoured-nation

MSY

Maximum Sustainable Yield

MTO

Multilateral Trade Organization

MTS

Multilateral Trading System

NGBT

Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications

NGOs

Non-governmental organizations

NGR

Negotiating Group on Rules

NGTF

Negotiating Group of Trade Facilitation, Doha Development Round

NT

National Treatment

NTBs

Non-tariff Barriers

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
x

PTA

Preferential Trade Agreement

PA

Plurilateral Agreement

S&DT

Special and Differential Treatment

SOFIA

The State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture

TNC

Trade Negotiating Committee

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UR

Uruguay Round

US

United States

QUAD

United States, European Union, Japan and Canada

WTO

World Trade Organization

xi

1

CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
“Trade is important for the 21st century, it is important for
prosperity. It is important for resilience. It is important for
sustainable growth. And the WTO is right at the heart of this”
- Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (WTO Director-General, 2021)
The importance of trade in human existence and survival cannot be overstated. The understanding
that every country is dependent on other countries for certain goods and services has always been
emphasized through cross-border interactions where countries exchange goods and services for
mutual benefit. To ensure that countries are committed to their trading obligations, international
organizations have been formed at the regional and global level.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international organization that regulates trading
activities among its members through the WTO Agreement1 and other associated trade agreements
negotiated under its aegis and that of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
of 1947 (‘GATT 1947’). 2
The WTO Agreement originates in the GATT 1947, a treaty concluded between 23 governments
in October 1947 that sought to promote stability in international trade relations. GATT 1947 was

1

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144
(entered into force 1 January 1995) [WTO Agreement].
2
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [GATT
1947].

2
in place for 48 years from 1948-1994. In that era, trade concessions were negotiated by GATT
member countries in a series of formal multilateral negotiations known as “Rounds”.
GATT 1947 was initially drafted with a focus on tariff matters and quotas.3 The drafters who
designed GATT 1947 foresaw that the most effective way to promote stability in international
trade was to oblige countries to ‘bind’ – or fix – their tariffs at individually negotiated levels
through reciprocal negotiations between pairs of countries. Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1947
provides that tariff reduction negotiations should be periodically held on a “reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis” among the contracting parties.4 However, GATT 1947 did not
specify how the reciprocity resulting from these negotiations should be measured or determined
among the contracting parties. The process and guidelines to determine reciprocity and the
particular method of securing trade concessions in each negotiating round was left to the estimate
of the contracting parties.5
The centerpiece of GATT 1947 was the requirement in GATT Art. II that members should not
exceed individual countries’ bound tariffs on imports.6 An additional requirement was the
obligation in GATT Art. I for members to extend their best, or “Most-Favoured-Nation” (MFN),

3

After the WWII, major trade barriers included tariffs imposed by governments, the quantitative restriction or quotas
which limits the quantity of specified goods allowed across the border, and the internal restrictions on exported goods
in terms of taxes such as sales tax. These trade barriers were the major focus of the envisaged trade agreement which
eventually became the GATT 1947. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (USA:
Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1990) at 67 [Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy]; Robert E.
Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law (USA: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993) at 3 [Hudec, Enforcing
International Trade Law].
4
Reciprocity is loosely defined as the practice of making an action conditional upon an action by a counterpart. See
Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki (eds), The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 3rd ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 161.
5
WTO,
“Art.
XXVIII
bis;
Analytical
Index
of
the
GATT”,
online:
WTO
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art28_bis_gatt47.pdf>.
6
See also John H. Jackson, World Trade and The Law of GATT (A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill Company Inc, 1969) at 201 [Jackson, Law of GATT]

3
tariff or treatment to the remainder of the GATT membership.7 The obligations in GATT Arts. I
and II were complemented by the National Treatment (NT) obligation in GATT Art. III to treat
imports no less favourably than domestically produced goods and the obligation in GATT Art. XI
to eliminate quantitative restrictions (i.e. quotas) on imports.8 A scholar sums up the GATT 1947
aim for world trade liberalization as trying to “… prohibit the application of quantitative
restrictions, to allow regulation of import (and export) through transparently administered nondiscriminatory [MFN] tariffs applied at the border, and then to work for the progressive reduction
of these tariffs through successive rounds of negotiations.”9 An idea that underpinned GATT 1947
tariff concessions by members was that tariff reduction negotiations should be carried on the
principle of reciprocity and the benefits extended on an MFN basis to every GATT 1947 member.

GATT 1947 concessions in the early rounds were undertaken in a negotiating framework that
originally followed an “offer and request” format involving bargaining between pairs of countries,
which was tempered by awareness of the MFN requirement and possibility of free-ridership.10 In
essence, pairs of countries originally negotiated tariff concessions inter se but always did so

7

Ibid at 249-270; John H. Jackson, William J. Davey &Alan O. Skyes, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations, Cases, Materials, and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic
Relations 5th ed (St. Paul MN: West Publishing Co, 2008) at 467-490 [Jackson et al].
8
Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 273-294; Jackson et al, supra note 7 at 537-586; Kevin Kennedy, “GATT
1994” in Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, Michael G. Plummer, eds, World Trade Organisation: Legal,
Political and Economic Analysis Vol. 1 (United States: Springer, 2005) at 114 [Kennedy, “GATT 1994”]; Hoekman,
& Kostecki, supra note 4 at 199-203.
9
Anwarul Hoda, ed, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO: Procedures and Practices,
2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 2.
10
An “offer and request” format implies that at each negotiating round, each negotiating party would make a "request"
in the form of a list of the trade concessions it desires from other negotiating parties, majorly countries that are
substantial importers of the formers' goods. Subsequently, each negotiating party will make an "offer" list consisting
of the concessions they are willing to grant if other negotiating parties accept their request list. Negotiating parties
then begin to negotiate bilaterally until a concession list is agreed upon. Every bilateral tariff concession benefit is
applied to all other GATT 1947 members on an MFN basis. Carl VanGrasstek The History and Future of the World
Trade Organization (Geneva: WTO, 2013) at 314-316. A “free-rider” in the WTO is a casual term used to infer that
a country that does not make any trade concessions nonetheless benefits from tariff cuts and concessions made by
other countries in negotiations under the MFN principle: WTO, Glossary Terms, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm>.

4
‘looking over their shoulder’ at other countries who might benefit from the concessions granted
by virtue of MFN. This dilemma neatly encapsulates the problem of ‘free-ridership.’ Freeridership was particularly problematic because it allowed countries to "free-ride" on the
commitments made by other countries without necessarily making any commitments of their own.
Over the next four decades, the growth of the GATT membership also led to an increase in
complexity of negotiations conducted via a traditional “offer and request” approach.11
As a result, in the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations (1963-1967) a “linear technique” for
negotiating tariff reductions was introduced, which employed a 50% cut as a “working
hypothesis”, or starting point, for negotiations but largely exempted agricultural products.12
Industrial tariffs fell substantially through this technique, but non-tariff barriers (NTBs) like antidumping, subsidies, and safeguards became problematic. To address these issues, there was the
negotiation of the first "side code" (on anti-dumping) to bring greater discipline to NTBs.13

11

Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 224; Hoda, supra note 9 at 32, Ibid, VanGrasstek at 316.
GATT, Meeting of Ministers, Conclusions and Resolutions Adopted at Meeting of Ministers (21 May 1963), GATT
Press Release 794 (29 May 1963), online: WTO <https://docs.wto.org/> at 12-14, [Kennedy Ministerial Declaration];
GATT, Trade Negotiations Committee, Resolution adopted on 6 May 1964, GATT Doc TN 64/27 (11 May 1964),
(online) <https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91880148.pdf> [Resolution adopted on 6 May 1964];
Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 223; Hoda, supra note 9 at 33-34. For detailed history on the preparatory,
negotiating process and the adopted Kennedy Round Agreements, see Bernard Norwood “The Kennedy Round: A
Try at Linear Trade Negotiations” (1969) 12:2 JL & Econ 297; Gilbert Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo
Round Negotiation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 60-67; John B Rehm, "Developments in the Law
and Institutions of International Economic Relations: The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations" (1968) 62:2 Am J
Intl L 403; Harry G. Johnson "The Kennedy Round." (1967) 23:8 The World Today 326.
13
Ibid, Winham at 69; See also, Kenneth W Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1970) at 174-177. The Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code came into force
on 1 July 1968, and it is formally referred to as "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade," its provisions are reproduced in 24th Sess, 15th Supp BISD (1968) 24 online: WTO
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/kennedy_e.pdf> at 24.
12

5
Notwithstanding this, the problem of free-ridership persisted. Also, the “linear technique” did not
address the phenomena of tariff peaks and escalations.14
A potential solution to the problem of tariff peaks was the “formula method” of negotiation
introduced in the subsequent Tokyo Round (1973-1979).15 Under the "formula method," a formula
was applied as a starting point for tariff reductions.16 However, the formula technique had the
potential to decrease tariffs in some areas but not others. 17 In addition, the basic issue of freeridership continued.

The Tokyo Round resulted in a number of side codes formally separate from GATT with a variable
membership. These side codes mainly focused on the problem of NTBs, including an extended
anti-dumping code.18 These side codes were entered into on a voluntary, take-it-or-leave-it basis.
When some members accepted the side codes following the Tokyo Round but others did not, a
pronounced asymmetry arose that later provoked disagreement within the GATT membership.19

Tariff peaks are also referred to as “exceptionally high tariffs.” These are tariffs of 15% or more, and they mainly
apply to products exported by developing countries such as textiles, clothing, and some agricultural products. Tariff
escalation occurs if tariffs rise with stages of further processing. For instance, a country may set low tariffs on imported
materials used by a domestic industry to reduce the cost of production and then set higher tariffs on finished products
to protect the goods produced by the industry. When an importing country escalates its tariffs, it becomes difficult for
countries producing raw materials to process and manufacture value-added products for export. WTO, Market Access:
Unfinished Business - Post Uruguay Round Inventory and Issues, (2001) Special Studies, No. 6 Economic Research
and
Analysis
Division,
World
Trade
Organization
(WTO),
Geneva.
1
at
12
online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/special_studies6_e.htm>. The linear tariff cut technique could not
address these tariff peaks. VanGrasstek, supra note 10 at 317; Hoekman & Kostecki, supra note 4 at 168, 196-198.
See also, Bernard Hoekman et al, “Eliminating Excessive Tariffs on Exports of Least Developed Countries”, (2002)
16:1 The World Bank Econ Rev 1.
15
GATT, Ministerial Declaration (14 September 1973), GATT/1134, online: WTO <https://docs.wto.org/> [Tokyo
Ministerial Declaration]; See generally, Winham, supra note 12.
16
The formula negotiating techniques is also called the 'harmonization' or 'non-linear' formula.
17
See VanGrasstek, supra note 10 at 313-319; Patrick Love & Ralph Lattimore, International Trade: Free, Fair and
Open? (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009) at 83; Winham, supra note 12 at 18.
18
For all the Tokyo Round side codes, see WorldTradelaw.net online: < https://www.worldtradelaw.net/>.
19
Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, supra note 3 at 121-123.
14

6
As international trade began to expand and develop in the postwar era, the GATT 1947's
limitations became apparent.20 As mentioned, free-ridership continued to be problematic. The
limitations of GATT 1947 resulted in the clamor for another negotiating round. To this end, the
Uruguay Round (1986-1994) (UR) was launched in 1986.21

The WTO Agreement was concluded at the end of the UR to address some of the above-mentioned
issues and make improvements in the functioning of the GATT 1947 system.22 All three of the
negotiating techniques mentioned above – offer-and-request, linear cut and formula approaches –
were employed or contemplated in the Round. However, in such a sprawling set of negotiations
another technique was also engaged in to conclude a final deal. A “single undertaking” negotiating
principle was followed for the adoption of all the negotiated trade agreements. This approach
provides that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."23 It mandates that every GATT 1947
member is to accept every negotiated trade commitment in the UR as a single integrated package.
The single undertaking method was introduced to promote deal-cutting between different issue
areas under negotiation and limit the free-ridership that had plagued trade agreements negotiated
in previous rounds.
The new WTO Agreement consolidated existing GATT 1947 obligations into a “single
undertaking”, thereby replacing the patchwork that had arisen under GATT 1947, the Tokyo side

20

Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 515-531.
GATT 1947, GATT Punta Del Este Declaration, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986, online:
<https://docs.wto.org/ > [UR Ministerial Declaration]
22
For a list of all the agreements negotiated at the UR, see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 14, 33 ILM 1143. reproduced in WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade
Negotiations:
The
Legal
Texts
(15
April
1994),
online:
WTO:
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/legal_texts_e.htm> (entered into force 1 January 1995) [Results
of the Uruguay Round].
23
Robert Wolfe, “The WTO Single Undertaking as Negotiating Technique and Constitutive Metaphor” (2009) 12:4
J Intl Econ L 835 [Wolfe, “The WTO Single Undertaking as Negotiating Technique and Constitutive Metaphor”].
21

7
codes, and extended basic GATT disciplines beyond goods to certain service and intellectual
property commitments.24 GATT’s dispute settlement system was also streamlined and brought
forward, along with a new feature, the possibility of appellate review of dispute settlement results,
designed to ensure accuracy and finality in dispute settlement results.25 Finally, the WTO was
constituted as a stand-alone organization under international law. Like the GATT 1947, the WTO
Agreement established the WTO as a negotiating forum but did not specify or favour a particular
means of negotiation among WTO members.26

The entry into force of the WTO Agreement in 1994 was a monumental achievement. Its timing
was also fortuitous. The Cold War had just ended, and there was a sensed need for new global
arrangements that would allow countries and individuals to develop peacefully under the rule of
law.

The successful conclusion of the UR also suggested that future rounds of international trade
negotiations could likewise be concluded based on a single undertaking. To further this aim, the
WTO membership began to advocate for the initiation of another negotiating round. To this end
the Doha Development Round (DDA/Doha Round) did eventually get underway in December
2001 with an ambitious mandate that foresaw further opening of agricultural and manufacturing
markets, expanded coverage of services and new disciplines in intellectual property.27

Over time, however, it became difficult to conclude the Doha Round. Commentators began to
point out how much trade-related growth was not always well distributed between and within
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WTO Agreement, supra note 1 at Art. II.
Ibid, Art. III:3.
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Ibid, Art. III:2.
27
WTO, Ministerial Declaration (14 November 2001), WTO Doc WT/Min (01)/Dec/1, online: <http://docs.wto.org>
[Doha Ministerial Declaration].
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member countries. In the Doha Round’s contentious atmosphere there seemed to be growing
ambivalence about the value of interdependence. The great sense of commonality and common
purpose that marked the early years of the WTO began to dissipate. Concern about free-ridership
also festered. In the WTO doubt and difference translated into a divergence of views about the
negotiating mandate and proper way forward in the Doha Round, a development which was
conveyed in increasingly indefinite final pronouncements at biennial WTO Ministerial
Conferences (MC).28 The divergence became significant enough that after the 2015 Nairobi
Ministerial the Doha negotiations were indefinitely suspended.29

One contributing factor to the current WTO institutional paralysis is the practice of consensus. As
under GATT 1947, the organization’s principal decision-making rule follows the practice of
consensus.30 Essentially, the consensus principle requires that decisions and rules should be
unanimously agreed upon by all WTO Members present at a formal meeting. The consensus
principle allows equal participation of all member countries in WTO rules and decision-making

Thus, at the Geneva Ministerial in 2011 Trade Ministers’ Elements for Political Guidance in the negotiations
recognized “that [WTO] Members need to more fully explore different negotiating approaches.” WTO, Ministerial
Conference, Elements for Political Guidance (1 December 2011), WTO Doc WT/MIN (11)/W/2, online: WTO
<https://docs.wto.org/> [MC of 1 December 2011]. At the Bali MC in 2013 agreements were announced on trade
facilitation and public stockholding for food security purposes but no mention was made of any “single undertaking”.
WTO, Bali Ministerial Declaration (11 December 2019), WTO Doc WT/MIN (13)/DEC, online: WTO
<https://docs.wto.org/>.
29
At the Nairobi MC in 2015 the Final Communiqué noted that “[m]any Members reaffirm the [Doha negotiations
…] Other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve
meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different views on how to address the negotiations.”
WTO, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration (19 December 2015), WTO Doc WT/MIN (15)/DEC, online: WTO
<https://docs.wto.org/>. It was after this statement that the Doha negotiations were indefinitely suspended. Finally, at
the Buenos Aires Ministerial in 2017 Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) were agreed to on in areas of E-commerce,
Investment Facilitation, Services Domestic Regulation and Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs),
but there was no Final Communiqué and even a stand-in “Chairperson’s Statement” could not be agreed.”. WTO,
Ministerial Conference, Address by Mr Roberto Azevêdo WTO Director-General (held on 13 December 2017), WTO
Doc WT/MIN (17)/74, online: WTO < https://docs.wto.org/>. [ WTO DG’s address of 13 December 2017].
30
WTO Agreement, supra note 1 at Art. IX:1.
28
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regardless of economic status or population size. The practice of consensus is important to
agreement, but over time it has been described as a source of inefficiency and deadlock.31

Since the suspension of the Doha Round the WTO has not been able to negotiate and conclude
new trade agreements due to pre-existing negotiating techniques and methods. Trade experts and
academic writers have suggested several options as to how the negotiations can be modified so
that new agreements can be concluded in future.
One possible option is the use of a 'critical mass' approach (CMA) to negotiations. 32 A CMA
exists when a subset of the WTO members – or ‘critical mass’ - agrees among itself to specific
sector disciplines that will apply on a non-discriminatory basis to all WTO members.33 WTO
CMAs apply on an MFN basis. In the CMA context, a non-discriminatory or MFN basis means
that every agreement arrived at through a CMA negotiation will benefit all WTO member states
even if non-participants are not a party to the initial negotiation and adoption of such agreements.
This extension of benefits occurs despite the fact that obligations will be limited to signatories.

In addition, CMAs do not require reciprocity among every WTO member. Unlike the GATT/WTO
multilateral trade negotiation formats of offer-and-request, linear cut, and formular methods that
envisage at least minimal reciprocity among all the GATT/WTO members, a CMA requires buy
in only from participants negotiating the proposed agreement. An argument in favor of a ‘critical

Bernard Hoekman, “Proposal for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment” (2011) Policy Research Working
Paper 5525 7.
32
For the purpose of this thesis, ‘critical mass’ and Critical Mass Agreement (CMA) may be used interchangeably.
33
Bernard Hoekman &Charles Sabel, “Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation, and the
WTO” (2019) Paper No. RSCAS 2019/10, , online: Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/60905/RSCAS_2019_10.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>; Gary C.
Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, “Will the World Trade Organization Enjoy a Bright Future?”, (2012) Policy Brief 12 –
11 Peterson Institute for Intl Econ 7; Kimberly A. Elliott, "The WTO and Regional/Bilateral Trade Agreements" in
Handbook of International Trade Agreements, Country, Regional and Global Approaches (London: Routledge, 2018)
at 19.
31
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mass’ negotiating technique is that decisions taken among sub-sets of the WTO membership could
facilitate the adoption of a forward-moving agenda and would not compromise the WTO
multilateral trading system's integrity and coherence.34

1.2 Problem Statement
The 'critical mass' approach was instrumental in the successful negotiation of some WTO trade
agreements in past, namely: the WTO Information Technology Agreement of 1996 (ITA)35, the
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication of 1997 (BTA) including the Telecommunications
Reference Paper36 and the Financial Services Agreement of 1996 (FSA).37 The successes of these
previous CMAs have been a motivation for the call for more ‘critical mass’ approaches in WTO
trade negotiations.
However, there have been diverging views on the extent of the suitability of the ‘critical mass’
method as a substitute for traditional WTO multilateral negotiating formats of offer-and-request,
linear cut, formula and single undertaking approaches. According to Hoekman, CMAs should be
limited to trade negotiation in certain subjects but cannot be extended to policy areas such as
industrial policy or subsidies.38 For Wolfe, "as trade policy moves behind the border, it is difficult
to consider a critical mass-based approach for regulatory changes engaged in by only a subset of
34

Patrick Low, "WTO Decision-Making for the Future" (2011) WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2011-05 1 at
8, online: World Trade Organisation <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201105_e.pdf>.
35
Agreement on Trade in Information Technology Products, Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade
in Information Technology Products, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc G/L/159/Rev.1 (26 March 1996), online:
WTO <https://docs.wto.org/> [ITA].
36
Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1997, 2061 UNTS 214, 32 ILM 354,
WTO Doc S/L/20 (entered into force on 5 February 1998) [GATS Fourth Protocol /BTA].
37
Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 3 December 1997, WTO Doc S/L/45
(entered into force on 1 March 1999) [GATS Fifth Protocol /FSA].
38
“Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization”, Bertelsmann Stiftung, ed, (Report of the
High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance, 2018) 1 at 36, online: Bertelsmann Stiftung
<https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/revitalizing-multilateral-governance-at-theworld-trade-organization/>.
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WTO."39 Again, the major concern here appears to be free-ridership. According to Bollyky, CMAs
may not be used to deepen or extend commitments covered under MFN provisions of WTO
agreements other than those on goods and services. 40

Cottier adds that because the impact of critical mass in rule-making requires careful consideration,
it is essential to identify areas where critical mass negotiations may occur and those where it would
be precluded.41 One major issue that limits a CMA’s coverage is free-ridership caused by MFN
treatment. According to Hufbauer, “[t]he unconditional MFN principle has always enjoyed more
affection in the textbooks than in the daily life of commercial policy.”42
Is the ‘critical mass’ negotiating approach limited in scope and coverage? Are there some domains
where a critical mass-oriented approach to negotiations is particularly appropriate or well-suited?
The opinions of these commentators profile the limits of the 'critical mass' approach in the WTO
negotiations. One scholar concludes that due to the free-ridership challenge and the lack of a
defined extent of coverage of a CMA, the practicability of a CMA for trade agreement negotiation
in the WTO should be examined on a case-by-case basis.43

Wolfe, “The WTO Single Undertaking as Negotiating Technique and Constitutive Metaphor”, supra note 23 at 850851.
40
Thomas J. Bollyky, A Role for the World Trade Organization on Regulatory Coherence, The E15Initiative,
Strengthening the Global Trade and Investment System for Sustainable Development Geneva (ICTSD & WEF,
August 2015) 1 at 2, online: e15inititative <https://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-RegulatoryCoherence-Bollyky-Final.pdf>.
41
Thomas Cottier, "A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision Making" in Debra P. Steger, ed, Redesigning the WTO
for the 21st Century (Canada: CIGI & Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010) 43 at 59.
42
Gary C. Hufbauer, “Should Unconditional MFN Be Revived, Retired or Recast?” in R.H. Snape ed, Issues in World
Trade Policy (UK: Palgrave Macmillan,1986) 33; See also Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, “Toward a Positive
Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System” (1996) 16 Intl Rev L
& Econ 27.
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Trade Agreements within the WTO Context” Raymond Saner, (2012) 1 CSEND Policy Brief No 7 at 26 online:
CSEND < http://www.csend.org/csend-policy-briefs/item/310-csend-policy-briefs>.
39

12

1.3 Research Objective

The thesis seeks to examine the viability of a critical mass-based approach for WTO trade
negotiations. To determine a CMA suitability for negotiating an agreement in a trade sector, a
number of issues should be addressed:
a. Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible.
b. Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure or other
means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.
c. Whether the resulting critical mass is high enough and commands adequate institutional power
in the concerned trade sector.
d. Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential.

As previous WTO CMAs will illustrate, these questions should be cumulatively answered in the
affirmative for a CMA negotiating arrangement to be possible in a trade sector.
This thesis will attempt a case study analysis of previous WTO CMAs including the WTO ITA,
the BTA, the Reference Paper, the FSA, and a projected WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies
(AFS). This thesis will conclude that due to various requirements implicit in its model the ‘critical
mass’ negotiating type may not be a suitable alternative to traditional types of trade negotiations
in every present and future WTO trade negotiation.
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1.4 Scholarly Contribution
As indicated, the WTO negotiating arm has broken down and there have been several proposals
on how to proffer a solution to this. In this thesis the ‘critical mass’ negotiating approach is
proposed as a way forward. However, there has been no detailed assessment of the ‘critical mass’
approach aside of commentators’ examination of the ‘critical mass’ as way to overcome the issue
of free-ridership in a CMA arrangement. As this thesis will show, there are other factors that should
be considered before a ‘critical mass’ approach can be applied in a WTO trade agreement
negotiation. The above-mentioned CMA questions are the original contribution made by this thesis
to existing literature on the concept of ‘critical mass’ in the WTO negotiation.

1.5 Research Methodology
The research undertaken in this thesis pursues more than one methodology through the different
chapters. The research undertaken is primarily a case study analysis. To achieve this, the research
will employ historical, doctrinal, empirical, and comparative methodologies.

The research will begin with a historical analysis of the significant events and happenings that
surrounded international trade activities before the establishment of the GATT 1947, especially
the economic effect of the Second World War (WWII), an examination of the shortcomings of the
GATT 1947 and its eventual replacement by the WTO Agreement. This historical background will
provide a clearer perspective and background for understanding the rationale for various
negotiating techniques and other practices employed in decision- and rule-making adopted under
GATT 1947, and later, the WTO Agreement.

With this background in mind, the research will examine the primary texts of the GATT and WTO
Agreement. In this case, the examination of the primary texts will provide a foundation for
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evaluating the multilateral trading system of the WTO and explain the benefits and drawbacks of
some of the major principles and practices that it now observes, including the practice of
consensus. In addition, secondary sources, including the opinion of text writers and journal articles
about CMAs and other forms of plurilateral agreement (PA) will be reviewed. This literature
review is pertinent because it provides exegesis for contemporary features and problems of the
WTO trading system, the listed alternatives to a multilateral approach for trade negotiations, and
the extent to which plurilateral alternatives can avoid current pitfalls.

Furthermore, a case study analysis is undertaken of WTO agreements concluded based on a
‘critical mass’ negotiation approach including the ITA, the BTA, the Reference Paper, and the
FSA. These will be compared and applied to ongoing negotiations concerning the AFS.

Through these methodologies, an appraisal of what a CMA entails, an analysis of its extent of
coverage in current international trade arrangements, and its limitations in contributing to future
agreements in the WTO Agreement, will be assessed.

1.6 Thesis Structure/Organization of Chapters
This thesis consists of five chapters. This opening chapter provides an introduction to the
background study; the research objective; and how the research objective will be achieved. Chapter
Two will provide a historical analysis of significant events that gave rise to today’s international
trading system. The historical analysis will explain the original formation of GATT 1947; the
WTO Agreement as its successor in 1994; an assessment of some of the multilateral trade
negotiating formats that were used during the GATT era; and the GATT/WTO’s multilateral
trading system’s limitations.

15
Chapter Three will analyze the concept of a WTO CMA and previous WTO CMAs, including the
ITA, the BTA, the Reference Paper, and the FSA. Chapter Four will examine the practicability of
the ‘critical mass’ method in ongoing negotiations over a WTO AFS. Chapter Five will provide
qualifications and observations pertaining to the use of a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method,
concluding that it may not be applicable in every type of trade agreement negotiation in the WTO.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. THE WTO – BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATIONS
2.1 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that regulates trading
relations between its members. 44 The WTO Agreement came into force in 1995 to replace the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) of 1947.45
This chapter examines the GATT and its transition to the WTO Agreement. It provides a brief
analysis of some of the multilateral trade negotiation rounds concluded to date and some of the
underlying principles and practices governing GATT/WTO arrangements and their shortcomings.
The WTO Agreement and its limitations are understood better when considered from the
perspective of a historical analysis. This analysis is pivotal to understanding the WTO Agreement
both as a treaty and an institution and its current limitations. The historical study will also serve as
the foundation for subsequent thesis chapters.

2.2 The Emergence of GATT 1947
The GATT 1947 was an international trade agreement regulating trading activities among its
contracting parties (or members) until it was replaced by the WTO Agreement in 1994. The GATT
1947 provided the substratum on which the WTO Agreement was later formed and operates to
date. The GATT came into force in 1947 after a projected International Trade Organization (ITO)
failed to materialize. To examine the formation of the GATT 1947 without mentioning an ITO

44
45

WTO Agreement, supra note 1.
GATT 1947, supra note 2.
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seems impossible because, according to Jackson, "The preparatory work for GATT is unusually
full and complex.... and ... it is ‘mingled’ with that of the ITO." 46

2.2.1 The International Trade Organization
After the Second World War (WWII), countries gathered in the international community to assess
the contribution of economic factors to the rise of political extremism in the 1930s, the devastating
effect of the war on international trade and to avoid economic uncertainty. International actors
were keen to establish an international institution that would prevent another Great Depression and
the unilateral protectionist policies of the then industrialized states that had been implemented in
the 1930s.47

The first step towards reorganizing the international economic order came about in 1944 at the
Bretton Woods Conference.48 At the Conference two international organizations were created,
namely: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the World Bank or IBRD).49 The IMF was designed to stabilize the international
monetary system while the IBRD was designed to promote reconstruction and development.
However, a third policy area of concern during the Bretton Woods Conference was international
trade. During the Conference international actors noted that governments ought to agree on ways
of reducing international trade obstacles and promoting beneficial international commercial

46

For the GATT 1947 preparatory work, negotiation, and policy, see Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 35–57;
Hudec, GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, supra note 3; Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law,
supra note 3 at 289.
47
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49
Jackson, Law of GATT, supra note 6 at 40.
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relations. During this time, the US and UK were also working on proposals for an ITO. In 1945
the US released a draft of its proposals which foresaw the creation of an ITO to administer
international trade relations.50

When the US made formal proposals for an ITO, the United Nations (UN) established a UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to coordinate international economic cooperation. 51 In
February 1946 during the ECOSOC first session, the US proposed a resolution at the UN,
Conference on Trade and Employment. The US proposal aimed to prepare a Charter for the ITO
and to address other issues.52 According to the US resolution, UN members were to set up a
Preparatory Committee and hold several sessions to prepare an ITO Charter.53

During one of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the ITO Charter in London in 1946
the Committee suggested that an interim arrangement – referred to as "GATT" - would be
necessary to "safeguard the value of tariff concessions” made during the ITO negotiating
sessions.54 Consequently, for this purpose a separate working group composed of the US, UK and
a handful of other countries began to negotiate the original GATT. In other words, the GATT was
to contain all the existing tariffs negotiations that had been extended to that time and to include
some protective clauses that would prevent tariff commitment evasion.55 The text of the GATT
was concluded in Geneva in October 1947, with entry into force set for 1 January 1948.

50
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Negotiations for GATT 1947 ran in parallel with those of the wider the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Employment. Consistent with its narrower purpose and limited number of participants, GATT
1947 was regarded as a fallback in case the Conference results were unacceptable. The Conference
was scheduled to wrap up in Havana at the beginning of 1948.
At the Havana Conference in 1948, the Final Act for the ITO was signed as part of the Charter.56
The Charter is often referred to as the Havana Charter. The Charter was not limited to tariffs issues;
it addressed and regulated tariffs and other areas such as employment and many other trade-related
matters. However, the ITO was envisaged as the central UN organization that would regulate
international economic relations among international actors, including GATT members.
Unfortunately, the ITO was considered too ambitious and never came into force because the US
and the UK opposed it.57

Because the ITO never came into force, GATT 1947 emerged as the chief instrument to regulate
international trade. It is noteworthy that the US was a significant force in the proposed ITO, the
GATT 1947 and many other major international trade agreements that were concluded after the
WWII. The US’s importance came about because it was the "dominant economic power" after the
WWII.58 This allowed it to be a first-mover in many issue areas and in promoting negotiations of
specific interest to it.
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2.2.2 The GATT 1947
The GATT was signed by 23 contracting parties at Geneva in October 1947. 59 It was never
intended to become an international organization, as explained above. Instead, it was supposed to
be an interim arrangement that would eventually be integrated into the proposed ITO.60 GATT
Art. XXIX provides that all of the GATT’s provisions except for the MFN principle would cease
to function once the ITO was established. Some scholars refer to the GATT as a contract because
it was an agreement between “Contracting Parties" and not as a “constitution” in the classic manner
of the foundational instrument of an international organization.61
Countries involved in GATT 1947 were styled ‘Contracting Parties’ and administrative
arrangements for the treaty remained deliberately modest. This modesty was due to the failure of
the ITO and an institutional desire to low-profile. For the first two decades of GATT 1947’s
existence the treaty’s secretariat was housed in a small villa, Le Bocage, on the grounds of the UN
headquarters in Geneva and generally elicited little outside scrutiny.

The negotiations that had been undertaken among a small group of countries for the establishment
of GATT 1947 reduced tariffs among members. These reductions were individualized and
reciprocal in the sense that countries each agreed to certain reductions traded-off against their

59

The contracting parties that first signed the GATT 1947 were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon,
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trading partners and then extended these reductions to the remainder of the GATT’s membership
via the MFN principle.62

GATT 1947 also contained a dispute settlement mechanism. This was operationalized under
GATT Art. XXIII. Under that provision a system of panels arose to determine whether national
measures “nullified or impaired” GATT trade commitments based on individual complaints
brought by members. Where a violation of the treaty was found, a panel could make a
recommendation of compliance or a ruling on a point of GATT law. A defendant country was then
under an obligation to comply, which it normally did by withdrawing the impugned legislation or
measure.63 GATT Art. XXIII:2 also mentions the possibility of a plaintiff state seeking an
authorization to suspend the application of concessions against the wrongdoer. However, this
retaliatory option proved awkward and was rarely pursued.64
On its face, GATT dispute settlement appeared – and often operated – in a bilateral fashion
‘contractually’. It usually involved disputes between pairs of countries. Retaliation through
selective market closure was possible though infrequently invoked. GATT dispute settlement
helped to resolve certain differences between members but did so only in a piecemeal fashion and
unevenly. Its regular operation was also hampered by decision-making rules.
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GATT 1947’s regular practice of decision-making was one of consensus, a practice which offered
a defendant country the opportunity to block an unfavorable panel report when it came up for
adoption. Approximately one-quarter of the 121 panel reports issued in the GATT 1947 era were
blocked.65

2.3 GATT 1947 Negotiating Techniques
2.3.1 Pre-Kennedy Round
The negotiations that resulted in GATT 1947 foresaw further periodic rounds of international trade
negotiations. During the GATT era (1947-1994) seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
were undertaken and completed. These were Geneva (1947), Annecy, France (1949), Torquay,
United Kingdom (1950-51), Geneva (1955-56), Dillion (1960-61), Kennedy (1964-67), Tokyo
(1973-79), and Uruguay (1986-1994) respectively. The first five rounds were devoted primarily to
tariff reductions. Governments bargained between themselves concerning only import tariff
reductions and for the removal of quantitative restrictions. The sixth and seventh rounds addressed
both tariff and NTBs in international trade.66 The conclusion of the UR in 1994 marked the end of
the GATT 1947 era and ushered in the WTO Agreement as its successor.

As explained, the drafters of the GATT 1947 projected that the most effective way to promote
stability in international trade was to oblige countries to ‘bind’ – or fix – their tariffs through
bilateral reciprocal negotiations among countries. GATT Art. XXVIIIbis provides that tariff
reduction negotiation should be held on a “reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.” The two
principles that guided the GATT 1947 negotiations among contracting parties were the principle
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of reciprocity and MFN.67 The GATT 1947 did not provide specificity on how reciprocity should
be measured among contracting parties. The process and guidelines to determine reciprocity and
the methods of concessions were left to the discretion of the contracting parties in each negotiating
rounds.68 However, based on the principle of reciprocity every GATT member was required to
make at least minimal concessions to benefit from other countries’ concessions.

Until the Kennedy Round, GATT 1947 tariff cuts commitments and concessions were undertaken
in a negotiating framework that originally followed an “offer and request” format that involved
bilateral concessions among the negotiating parties. These negotiations generally took the form of
specific reciprocity. No government was required to grant unilateral concession or grant a
concession without receiving adequate concessions in return.69 These concessions among the pairs
of countries were then applied on an MFN basis to the remainder of the GATT 1947 membership.70

2.3.2 The Kennedy Round
The Kennedy Round was the sixth multilateral trade negotiation round of the GATT 1947 era.71 It
resulted in eight multilateral trade agreements.72 The round was launched by the adoption of a
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supra note 12 at 299; Woolcock, supra note 58 at 50-51.
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resolution at the 1963 Ministerial Conference at Geneva.73 During the Kennedy Round, the GATT
1947 contracting parties employed a new method for tariff negotiation different from that of the
traditional ‘offer and request’ method. The Ministerial Conference that launched the Round
adopted a “substantial linear tariff reductions” approach to trade tariff cuts.74 The tariff negotiation
in the Kennedy Round was to be conducted on an MFN basis and on the principle of reciprocity
among the negotiating participants.75

The linear tariff reduction approach was adopted for a number of reasons. First, with the increase
in the GATT 1947 membership it became time-consuming and cumbersome to continue the
bilateral ‘offer and request’ item-by-item negotiations.76 Second, the disparity in tariff levels
between countries became a major issue. As tariff levels decreased in most countries it became
difficult to determine the measure of reciprocity required from each GATT member to ensure a
balance in trade agreement negotiations, especially from countries with low tariffs vis a vis
countries with higher tariffs.77

To address these issues, the linear tariff reduction was to be equal for all participants, and in cases
there were "significant disparities in tariff levels," the reduction would be based upon “special
rules of general and automatic application.”78 In other words, there were certain minimum
exceptions allowed in the application of the linear tariff reduction formula. For instance, the Trade
Negotiating Committee (TNC) that administered the negotiations agreed that the linear reduction
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for tariffs on industrial products would be 50 percent, except concerning “overriding national
interest issues”.79 In turn, the “overriding national interest issues” exception was to be determined
through a "confrontation and justification" (“c and j”) process in the negotiations themselves. 80

In addition, a form of flexibility was given to developing countries and LDCs. It was agreed that
developed countries should not expect to receive ‘full’ reciprocity from developing countries and
LDCs.81 In the end, developing countries and LDCs were to make ‘contributions’ according to
their level of development and trade needs.82
During the Kennedy Round, NTBs became a major trade issue. In essence, lower tariffs exposed
other forms of trade protectionism. Hence, aside from tariff negotiations the round attempted to
address specific NTBs.83 The major non-tariff agreement negotiated in the Kennedy Round was
the Anti-Dumping Code.84 The code was necessitated by EC and Canadian complaints against the
US’s prolonged anti-dumping actions.85 The US also complained about other countries' lack of
transparent anti-dumping procedure and Canada's lack of an injury test in its own anti-dumping
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practices.86 Some form of international discipline on anti-dumping action was therefore deemed
advisable.

After the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code was negotiated, the US Congress passed a bill
prohibiting the US Tariff Commission from implementing the Code because it was negotiated
without "explicit consent from the Congress."87 The US Congress' failure to implement the
Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code was instrumental in spurring the negotiating of a formal
GATT anti-dumping code during the subsequent Tokyo Round.
The Kennedy Round was also flawed in several respects. First, the “offer and request” type of
negotiation which the round sought to eliminate was applied by most developed countries after or
in addition to the linear cut. Second, the linear cut agreed to during the Round was itself deficient.
The linear tariff reduction technique resulted in a uniform cut of the entire country’s tariff
schedules in the same proportion. This meant that all tariffs, both high and low, were cut at the
same rate, thereby leaving tariff disparities intact.88 In other words, tariff imbalance still remained
because the linear cut could not address the issue of tariff disparity.89

Ibid. Hudec notes that “[i]n the Kennedy Round negotiations, governments wanting to tighten and refine the
discipline on the use of anti-dumping duties … resorted, in 1967, to a separate agreement. … Although only the major
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As tariff levels continued to decrease in most countries, the difficulty in determining the measure
of adequate reciprocity that these ‘low-tariff countries’ could offer to achieve further concessions
from countries with high tariffs persisted.

In addition, the linear technique could only be used to reduce fixed tariffs for trade liberalization.
Complex trade measures including agricultural tariffs and NTBs that were not quantifiable could
not be addressed through the linear tariff reduction negotiating method.90

Furthermore, there was the thorny issue of free-ridership, in which a number of countries
benefitted from concessions without themselves making concessions. The issue of free-ridership
continued to be problematic after the Kennedy Round.

2.3.3 The Tokyo Round (1973-1979)
To address the limitations of the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round was launched. 91 The Tokyo
Round Declaration was adopted at the conclusion of the 1973 Ministerial Conference in Tokyo.92
The Tokyo Round was the seventh multilateral trade negotiation Round in the GATT era and it
achieved substantial implementation by 1980.
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The Tokyo Round featured GATT 1947’s core principles of reciprocity and MFN. The Tokyo
Declaration stated that “the negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of mutual
advantage, mutual commitment and overall reciprocity, while observing the most-favoured-nation
clause, and consistently with the provisions of the General Agreement relating to such
negotiations.”93
The Tokyo Round negotiations aimed to “conduct negotiations on tariffs by employment of
appropriate formulae of as general application as possible.”94 The introduction of the “formula”
method negotiation was to ensure harmonization in tariff reduction, particularly higher tariff peaks
that the linear tariff reduction method could not address. In other words, instead of equal tariff
reduction across board as in a linear cut, a formula approach meant that the higher the tariff, the
larger the reduction.95
To achieve a tariff negotiation based on an “appropriate formula” at the start of the Tokyo Round
negotiation, the negotiating parties proposed several tariff cutting formulas for the round’s tariff
reduction on industrial products.96 Eventually, the Tokyo Round negotiation adopted the “Swiss
Formula” for tariff cuts.97 However, the Swiss formula was useful for cutting tariffs in some areas
but not others.98

The developing countries were to make contributions consistent with their “individual development, financial and
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For NTBs, the general aim of the Tokyo Round negotiations was to “reduce or eliminate non-tariff
measures or, where this is not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or distorting
effects, and to bring such measures under more effective international discipline.”99 However, the
formula method employed during the round could not address NTBs because of their
unquantifiable and unmeasurable nature. Instead, disciplines on NTBs were negotiated in form of
bilateral discussions among some WTO members, most of whom were developed countries.

The Tokyo Round resulted in nine agreements and four understandings. The nine agreements were
explicitly referred to as "side codes", with seven of these being focused on NTBs including an
extended anti-dumping code.100 The “side codes” were adopted as stand-alone treaties with a
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dispute settlement mechanism for each.101 GATT members were allowed to choose which side
codes they would adhere to.102
In the main, developing countries did not sign on to the side codes.103 After the side codes became
operational, some members accepted the side codes but others did not, causing the fragmentation
that elicited disagreement within the GATT membership.104 Initially, non-signatories were denied
certain benefits, including limited participation in the organs and committees set up to implement
the codes. Also, non-signatories were exempted from substantive benefits, including market access
benefits extended under two of the side codes involving government procurement and
subsidy/countervail matters. In addition, the Technical Barriers to Trade Code was implemented
in a way that only its parties received notifications of new or changed standards.
National implementation of the side codes was also subject to peculiarities. Thus, the US
implementation of the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code allowed only parties to the Code
to benefit from the requirement of an injury test in US countervailing duty actions.

101

One of the reasons for the independent dispute settlement mechanism for each side code was because the side codes
were adopted outside the scope of the GATT 1967. It was impossible for the GATT dispute system to adequately
enforce most of the side codes especially the NTBs.
102
The side codes were an attempt to circumvent the GATT 1947’s cumbersome amendment procedures, which
required approval by at least two-thirds of GATT members. GATT 1947, supra note 2 at Art. XXX. Hudec notes that
before the Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979) “the GATT had experimented in a few cases with making changes
in rules by means of separate side agreements” including an amendment prohibiting export subsidies for non-primary
products in 1954-55, the GATT Multi-fibre Arrangement of 1974, and the Kennedy Round anti-dumping code. Robert
Hudec, Developing Countries and the GATT Legal System, supra note 86 at 81.
103
Hudec
notes
that
“[o]f the 65 or so developing countries in the GATT, only a handful signed the Tokyo Round codes.” Ibid at 88.
104
For instance, the creation of the Tokyo Round side codes raised the issue of whether GATT’s unconditional MFN
obligation required that improvements in trade access granted to other code signatories had to be extended to other
GATT members who were not signatories. Winham, supra note 12 at 355; Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law,
supra note 3 at 123; John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations
2nd ed (Cambridge: MIT Paper Press, 1989) at 144 [Jackson, The World Trading System]; Manfred Elsig, "WTO
Decision-Making: Can We Get a Little Help from the Secretariat and the Critical Mass?' in Debra P. Steger ed,
Redesigning the WTO for the 21st Century (Canada: CIGI & Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010) 67 at 76-77.

31
Nevertheless, non-signatories still sought benefits under the Codes. Through the GATT Decision
of 28 November 1979, these benefits were extended to every GATT 1947 member. Yet, once again
free ridership continued to be a major and sensitive issue in the GATT.105
2.3.4 The Uruguay Round
2.3.4.1 Introduction
The UR was the last negotiating round that occurred during the GATT 1947 era. The UR was the
most protracted round of the GATT era. It is referred to as "the most ambitious and comprehensive
of all Rounds."106 The UR's Final Act was formally adopted on April 15, 1994, at the Marrakesh
Ministerial Conference in Morocco, where 111 participating countries signed it.107 The Final Act
makes clear that the WTO Agreement contains the “GATT 1994”, a treaty encapsulating the
reformulated GATT 1947, eighteen trade agreements, and the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations adopted by the TNC on December 15, 1993.108
An overview of the Round will give an insight into the rationale for the WTO Agreement’s
establishment and how it addressed some of the problems identified above.109 The brief analysis
will also give a foundation to the thesis's subsequent discussion.
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2.3.4.2 The UR Negotiations
In June 1981, some of the GATT 1947 contracting parties, including the US, began to meet to
discuss the global economic situation and means of improving the GATT 1947 multilateral trade
system. As international trade began to expand and develop in the postwar era, the GATT 1947's
limitations became apparent. The GATT 1947’s institutional limitations were part of the reasons
for the UR multilateral trade negotiations.110 Some of the GATT 1947's limitations included its
"provisional" nature; the undefined relationship between the GATT 1947 and other Bretton Woods
agreements; the difficulties of its amendment process; and shortcomings in the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism.111

After numerous deliberations during the subsequent years at various GATT ministerial
conferences, the GATT contracting parties launched another round, christened the Uruguay Round
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986.112 A TNC was subsequently set up for the UR multilateral
trade negotiation.
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The UR was meant to correct GATT’s deficiencies and address new subjects.113 The UR was
originally projected to end in 1990. However, in July 1990 GATT’s Director-General stated that
the TNC had assembled only “a compendium of positions, rather than draft agreements.”114 At the
1990 Ministerial Conference in Brussels, the negotiating parties agreed to extend the Round's
deadline so that they could “reconsider and reconcile their positions in some key areas of the
negotiations."115

After the Brussels MC was concluded, negotiations among the TNC began again in July 1991. In
December 1991 a “Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations” was consolidated.116 This Draft was referred to as the "Dunkel Draft" after
Arthur Dunkel, the Swiss administrator who served as GATT’s DG from 1980-1993. The Dunkel
Draft was not accepted as the UR Final Act by the GATT negotiating parties because of the lack
of clarity in the aim and purpose of its agricultural coverage.117 Instead, after protracted
negotiations the UR was concluded in 1993. The Round had lasted for almost seven years.

2.3.4.3 The UR Negotiating Modalities
At the launch of the UR, the UR Ministerial Declaration did not specify the negotiating method to
be adopted by the contracting parties.118 Tariff matters were to be negotiated by “appropriate
methods, to reduce or, as appropriate, eliminate tariffs including the reduction or elimination of
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high tariffs and tariff escalation...”.119 For NTBs, the aim was to “reduce or eliminate non-tariff
measures, including quantitative restrictions, without prejudice to any action to be taken in
fulfillment of the rollback commitments.”120 The negotiating format for each sector to be
negotiated at the UR was, to an extent, left to the discretion of the contracting parties.121

Although the UR Ministerial Declaration did not make explicit provision for reciprocity in tariff
negotiations, it stated that “Negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner, and consistent
with the objectives and commitments agreed in this Declaration and with the principles of the
General Agreement in order to ensure mutual advantage and increased benefit to all
participants.”122

After several deliberations, the UR adopted a combined approach of both formula and request and
offer negotiating formats for tariffs on industrial products.123 A zero-for-zero tariff elimination was
also applied to certain sectoral negotiations including a proposed agreement on IT products,
negotiations on construction equipment, and distilled spirits. 124

As a result of the free-ridership of most developing countries and LDCs in previous rounds, the
UR Ministerial Declaration introduced a “single undertaking” negotiating tool.125 Part 1(B)(ii) of
the UR Declaration states, "The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of
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the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking…"126 The idea of a single
undertaking means that virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible
package and cannot be agreed separately. According to VanGrasstek, the UR Ministerial
Declaration adopted the single undertaking method because the US and other developed countries
wanted to avoid the free-ridership of developing countries. The free-ridership issue was best
"remedied [by] tying the full range of agreements in a round into an indivisible deal."127

On the other hand, developing countries wanted a trade round that would take into account their
needs in agriculture and other trade sectors of concern to them. With the single undertaking and
the consensus decision-making principle, developing countries would be able to refuse any
package that did not include matters of significant importance to them. This way every party
envisaged a “win-win” situation.
The UR’s chief accomplishment was the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, which succeeded
GATT 1947. The WTO Agreement will be briefly examined below.

2.4 The World Trade Organization
2.4.1 Introduction
As explained, the WTO Agreement came into force as part of the Final Act signed at Marrakesh
in April 1994.128 The WTO as an international organization was formally established by virtue of
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the WTO Agreement.129 As mentioned, the WTO Agreement created a single institutional
framework that consolidated previous areas of coverage in a single instrument and created a new
package of obligations among WTO member states.

The WTO Agreement administers the multilateral trading system (MTS) that now encompasses
the GATT 1994 (i.e. the amended and reformulated GATT 1947) and other multilateral trade
agreements concluded under the UR.130 In a number of instances, it also brings forward a number
of principles and practices observed under GATT 1947. This includes the GATT 1947’s practice
of consensus in decision-making. Hence, WTO Art. IX:1 provides that the "WTO shall continue
the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947."

2.4.2 The Consensus Principle
In ordinary parlance, consensus is a group's unanimous decision to adopt or reject a decision or an
act. Consensus is the most common negotiating and decision-making form in most international
organizations.131 Under the WTO Agreement, Art. IX consensus is deemed to exist "if no Member,
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present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision."132
The consensus principle aims to allow all states' equal participation regardless of their population,
size, or economic status. Since all WTO actors must apparently consent to an agreement before it
is adopted, in theory there is no room for sidelining any WTO actor. Ehlerman opines that a
consensus-based decision enjoys broad support and secures implementation because both the
"power stakeholders and the minorities are in cooperation.133 Cottier refers to the consensus rule
as the "most democratic form of decision-making.”134

At a glance, the consensus principle seems like a leveler among the WTO developed and
developing countries because no decision will be taken unless all countries agree to it. Before the
WTO Agreement’s conclusion, the consensus principle succeeded because GATT 1947’s
founding countries were a group of like-minded members that had the same trade liberalization
goals. These countries had the mutual understanding that tariff reduction among GATT member
states furnished a common benefit for all.135

At the same time, the consensus principle creates a lowest common denominator whereby
negotiations will have to proceed and achieve results in the most diluted form. It also privileges
holdouts, who may be tempted to withhold approval in order to secure narrow advantages. In
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addition, with the WTO membership having increased to 164 countries today it is nearly
impossible to find agreement among such a widespread and diverse membership.

In addition, it is worth considering that most developing countries involved in the GATT 1947
were at an early stage of their independence. They had not invested in GATT/WTO participatory
roles and later were mostly contented with their WTO membership title. A scholar rightly puts,
"At most, independent African countries identified with their former colonial masters; hence
decisions were taken in their support.”136 As such, the GATT ‘s practice of consensus was a
reflection of a particular degree of accord that does not have easy parallel in the more complex
reality of the WTO era. In current arrangements the range of commitments required by WTO
membership is substantial. To insist on a consensus among all the WTO members for this wide
range of commitments at every negotiation is not practicable.137

2.4.3 The WTO Negotiating Modality
The WTO Agreement Art. III enumerates the functions of the WTO. 138 One of these is the
negotiation of trade agreements. WTO Art. III:2 provides:
The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning
their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the
Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a forum for further
negotiations among its members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and
a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be
decided by the Ministerial Conference.
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Simply put, the WTO serves as a forum where its parties negotiate multilateral trade agreements.
However, the WTO Agreement does not go on to specify which method of negotiation is to be
used in the negotiations themselves. Instead, as mentioned, since the WTO’s establishment
different negotiating format have been utilized in the negotiation of international trade agreements
among the WTO members.139
Nevertheless, the example of the single undertaking approach to negotiations initiated during the
UR remains important, at least as a legacy matter.140 Thus, WTO Agreement Art. XII provides that
any state that intends to join the WTO must accept the WTO Agreement and its annexures without
any reservations.

Although the single undertaking approach does not have a formal legal

manifestation in the WTO Agreement, it was applied in the Doha Round launched in the 2001
Doha Ministerial Conference.141 The single undertaking approach is always referred to as "nothing
is agreed until everything is agreed."142 It provides that all commitments must be accepted as a
whole package among all WTO members. This is to prevent “cherry-picking” by members and to
ensure uniformity of obligations among the membership generally, thereby minimizing the freeridership problem

2.5 Features of the Multilateral Trading System
Aside the consensus principle and the notion of the treaty as a single undertaking, the WTO
Agreement also continues to apply other GATT 1947 principles and practices in its trade
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negotiations, adoption, and implementation. A brief examination of these principles will provide
the necessary foundation for subsequent discussions in the thesis. These principles include:

2.5.1 Non-Discrimination
One of the WTO Agreement’s tenets is to ensure inclusivity. The aim is to create an institution
that ensures its members do not engage in unfair trade practices or treat a member’s goods, services
or intellectual property better than other members’ goods, services and intellectual property. The
GATT/WTO non-discrimination principle features two prongs, namely:

2.5.1.1 Most-Favoured Nation
GATT Art. I provides that “… any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties.” 143 The purpose of the MFN principle is to reduce trade friction and
avoid trade distortion caused by conditional trade policies. GATT provisions allow for a broad
MFN treatment among all members. In this way, international actors do not have to "depend on
the individual participants' economic or political clout" for trading liberalization. 144

MFN treatment helped to eliminate discrimination and promote fairness among GATT and now
WTO members. In particular, developing countries and LDCs benefit from the ease of market
access afforded by developed countries. But for the MFN treatment, developing countries and
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LDCs would not have been privy to these benefits. MFN is enshrined in virtually every
international trade agreement after the GATT 1947 and present WTO trade agreements.145

2.5.1.2 National Treatment
The second prong of the non-discrimination principle in the GATT/WTO is National Treatment
(NT).146 NT has two facets. First, in terms of fiscal discrimination members should not impose
extra taxes or internal charges on imported like products or similar or substitutable products.147
Second, in terms of broad regulatory discrimination NT provisions stipulate that imported products
should be treated no less favorably than domestic like products.148 The essence of the NT
commitment is to eliminate domestic trade policies and regulations that protect domestic markets
and adversely affect imported like products. 149

2.5.2 Special and Differential Treatment
Originally, most GATT 1947 members were developed countries but today most WTO members
are developing countries. In recognition of this evolution, the WTO multilateral trading system
allows for the principle of Special and Differentiated Treatment (S&DT).150 As such, certain
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countries whose economy, according to the GATT 1947 Article XVIII (1), "can only support low
standards of living and [is] in the early stages of development" are granted certain flexibilities.

Countries that benefit from S&DT are developing countries and LDCs. Both are allowed to deviate
temporarily from certain GATT provisions in selected instances.151 Countries that fall into these
categories are not expected to adhere to the principle of reciprocity in the same way as developed
countries.

Qualifications for developing country status have not been explicitly defined by the GATT/WTO,
although the WTO Preamble refers to developing countries and LDCs. Enjoyment of developing
country status in the WTO is self-identification.152 A country can unilaterally declare itself to be a
developing country without any contention or need to prove that status. However, the WTO
Agreement defines an LDC by reference to the U.N.’s definition. WTO Art. XI:2 accepts the
U.N.s’ designation of a country as least-developed for purposes of the WTO Agreement.153
The WTO classifies S&DT provisions in six categories. These are:154 1) provisions aimed at
increasing trade opportunities; 2) provisions that require WTO members to safeguard the interests
of developing country members; 3) the idea of flexibility of commitments from developing
countries; 4) transitional implementation periods; 5) technical assistance; and 6) provisions
relating to measures to assist LDC members.
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The foregoing are some of the fundamental principles and practices that defined the GATT 1947
trade agreement negotiation process and that are now operative under the WTO Agreement.

As explained, the WTO has launched only one negotiating round since its establishment in 1995.
That round was launched at the 2001 MC in Doha and was suspended in 2015. A concise analysis
of the negotiating modalities and an update of progress under the Doha Round is also imperative
for a better understanding of the subsequent chapters in the thesis.

2.6 The Doha Development Agenda
The Doha Round was the ninth multilateral trade negotiation round in GATT/WTO history. The
Round was launched at the 2001 Ministerial conference in Doha.155 It was expected to be
concluded on 1 January 2005, and it involved 21 discrete subjects or items including agriculture
and food security, non-agricultural market access, services, electronic commerce, TRIPS, and
S&DT. The Doha Round was formally called the "Doha Development Agenda” (DDA or Doha
Round).

2.6.1 Description of the Doha Development Agenda
One reason for a new round in 2001 included the proliferation of regional trade agreements and
the challenge that this represented to the WTO system. Since the conclusion of the WTO
Agreement in 1994 there had been a degree of competition posed to its primacy by the conclusion
of regional trade arrangements. At the same time, developing countries and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) perceived that the WTO Agreement was not a fair and balanced
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arrangement and the only way to correct the imbalance arising from the UR was through the launch
of a new round.156

However, developed countries also wanted an expansion in coverage involved in some of the UR
negotiations. For instance, talks on agriculture and services could be further expanded only through
another multilateral trade negotiation round that would involve cross-issue linkages and tradeoffs.157 In addition, the US and other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) members saw the need for a new round as a way to increase economic opportunities and
trade with developing countries.158 Other countries considered that a new round would also make
up for the failure to reach an agreement on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment and other new
disciplines, including competition policies, especially in the aftermath of the failed Seattle
Ministerial Conference in 1999.159

Thus, with varying agendas, the WTO members launched the Doha Round in 2001.

2.6.2 Post-Doha Development Agenda Declaration
After the Doha Round launch in late 2001, negotiations began in the different committees set up
for each subject under negotiation. These committees were monitored by the WTO TNC, which
oversaw progress as a whole.

The Doha Round progressed only very slowly, punctuated by the WTO Ministerial Conferences
at two-year intervals. The Doha Round stumbled on a number of occasions, notably at Cancún,
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Hong Kong and twice in Geneva.160 The 2003 Cancún MC was supposed to be for "stock-taking,"
where WTO members were to discuss the way forward. Unfortunately, the Cancún MC ended in
a deadlock because members could not agree on agricultural matters and the so-called “Singapore
issues” (Trade and Investment, Trade and Competition Policy, Transparency in Government
Procurement, and Trade Facilitation) identified at the time of the Singapore Ministerial Conference
in 1996.161
In addition, at the Geneva Ministerial in 2011 the Trade Ministers’ Elements for Political Guidance
document appeared to call into question the idea of a single undertaking by noting that WTO could
“advance negotiations, where progress can be achieved, including focusing on the elements of the
Doha Declaration that allow Members to reach provisional or definitive agreements based on
consensus earlier than the full conclusion of the single undertaking.”162 Despite the idea that
agreements might be concluded in a piecemeal way as stated by the Trade Ministers in the 2011
Geneva MC, negotiations in Doha Round listed subjects were not brought to a successful
conclusion, except for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) concluded at the 2013 Bali MC.163
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Given the lack of agreement, the Doha negotiations were indefinitely suspended after the Nairobi
MC in 2015.164

2.6.3 The Doha Development Agenda Round Negotiating Modality
Deliberation on negotiating formats for tariff cuts contained in the Doha Round began after the
2001 Doha MC. At the 2005 Hong Kong MC, WTO members agreed to select a negotiating
modality before April 30, 2006.165 On April 21, 2006, the WTO DG, Pascal Lamy announced that
there was no consensus for agreement on negotiating modalities.166 Eventually, the WTO members
agreed to a formula-based tariff reduction approach and a “request and offer” process for
negotiation on services trade liberalization.167 As mentioned, the Doha Round was suspended
indefinitely in 2015.

2.6.4 The Single Undertaking Principle
Due to the single undertaking principle's success in the UR, scholars began to promote the idea of
it as a suitable practice for the multilateral trading system. For Siebert, "packaging advantages into
one bundle is a promising approach…"168 Wolfe added that the single undertaking is the only
mechanism that ensures an “appropriate aggregation” of issues and participants between

Supra note 29. For reasons on the Doha Round failure, see generally, Robert Wolfe, “First Diagnose, Then Treat:
What Ails the Doha Round?” (2015) 14: 1 World Trade Rev 7; Hufbauer &Schott, supra note 33 at 3; Hoekman &
Kostecki, supra note 4 at 141.
165
US Congress, Report for Congress, “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda”
(2012) Congressional Research Service 1 at 5.
166
Ibid.
167
The WTO members agreed that (at least) two coefficients would be used for the formula-based tariff reductions,
one for developed countries and another for developing nations. The different coefficients were adopted so that
developed countries would reduce their tariffs proportionally in accordance with the notion of S&DT. Hoekman &
Kostecki, supra note 4 at 143.
168
Horst Siebert, “What Does Globalization Mean for the World Trading System?”, in Edward McWhinney, ed, From
GATT to the WTO, The Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium, (Kluwer Law International B.V., 2000)
137 at 158.
164

47
developing and developed countries.169 The single undertaking practice allows trade-offs among
GATT/WTO members. Alongside the consensus principle, a single undertaking ensures that every
actor benefit in some way from every WTO round.

To be sure, the Doha Round had adopted the concept of a single undertaking negotiation tool as
had featured in the UR. Thus, the Doha Ministerial Declaration stated:

With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the
negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements
reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis.
Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of
the negotiations.170
Despite the benefits of a single undertaking approach, the certainty of it enabling the conclusion
of a successful round in the WTO remains questionable. The single undertaking was initially
designed to facilitate an equitable global agreement in the specific and contingent circumstances
of the UR and address the core issue of free-ridership. However, it may no longer be a useful
negotiating tool. Instead, the idea of a single undertaking has become a way for countries to hold
the negotiations hostage for selfish individual gain. The multilateral trading system has now
become a herculean task in seeking agreement rather than a means of unification within the agreed
framework of the WTO Agreement. According to Croome, the package approach to trade
negotiations is “like a convoy of ships [since] a big negotiation covering a range of subjects takes
time to assemble and, once on the move, can only progress at the pace of its slowest element. Its

Robert Wolfe, “Global Trade as a Single Undertaking: The Role of Ministers in the WTO” (1996) 51:4 Intl J 690
at 697.
170
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 27 at para 47.
169

48
agenda is usually overloaded; it is easily held hostage to doubts or delays in a key participating
country.”171
Emphasizing the deficiencies of a single undertaking approach Pascal Lamy stated, “It is absurd
to push, as the EU has done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition and investment
on countries so poor that some cannot even afford WTO diplomatic representation. If such rules
have any place in the WTO, all but its richest members should be free to opt in or out of them.
Refusing such flexibility will only lead to a repetition of the deadlock that sank Cancun.”172 Unlike
in the UR, in the Doha Round countries - particularly developing countries - were reluctant to
negotiate agreements that they were incapable of implementing in the form of a single
undertaking.173

As indicated, for several reasons, including the single undertaking approach to negotiations, the
Doha Round failed and was indefinitely suspended in 2015.174

2.7 WTO Joint Statement Initiatives
In light of the failure of the Doha Round and general paralysis in WTO negotiations, some WTO
members undertook a relatively new negotiating approach to trade agreements and rules outside
the WTO in 2017.175 These initiatives are referred to as "Joint Statement Initiatives" (JSIs). JSI
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proponents aim "to initiate forward-looking, results-oriented negotiations or discussions on issues
of increasing relevance to the world trading system."176 So far, the JSI has been used as a
negotiating tool with respect to cutting-edge issues not regulated within the WTO, including
regulatory policies on E-commerce177, Investment Facilitation for Development178, Services
Domestic Regulation179, and Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs).180
Basically, JSIs are proposed rules negotiated among some WTO "like-minded" members without
adherence to the consensus principle. Although the initial communication that launched these JSIs
did not specifically mention how MFN would apply to negotiated results, one of the crucial points
for discussion in JSI negotiations is how MFN provisions will apply in the implementation stage.181
One option is for JSI benefits to apply to all WTO members automatically in the same way as a
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CMA.182 Hence, JSI proponents opine that if the JSIs apply on an MFN basis then JSI results could
be implemented and incorporated under the WTO without the need for consensus among WTO
members.
However, some WTO members, notably India and South Africa, have pointed out that "open"
plurilateral agreements of a JSI-type – regardless of how they apply - are "legally inconsistent"
with the multilateral trading system of the WTO as long as there is no adherence to the consensus
principle.183
The JSI communication expressly states that they are to be open to every interested WTO
member.184 There is also the possibility of the JSIs’ benefits being extended to all WTO members,
including non-participants. In this connection it is worthwhile inquiring whether JSIs conform to
WTO Agreement principles? Are India and South Africa correct in their arguments concerning the
WTO-inconsistency of JSIs?
On the surface JSIs seem to be a logical way forward for the WTO in negotiating trade agreements,
especially in new areas not regulated by the WTO Agreement. Nevertheless, India and South
Africa’s argument is premised on the need to distinguish between rulemaking/amendment and
modification of Schedules of Concessions in the WTO Agreement. On the one hand, from the
treaty’s express provisions it would appear arguably correct that rule amendment or
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implementation of new rules in the WTO requires consensus. On the other hand, both GATT 1994
and GATS provide express procedures on how WTO members can unilaterally improve or modify
their schedules of commitments concerning market access and national treatment for goods and
services.
For example, with respect to the modification of WTO members' schedules on goods, GATT Art.
XXVIII provides:
A contracting party (hereafter in this Article referred to as the "applicant
contracting party") may, by negotiation and agreement with any contracting party
with which such concession was initially negotiated and with any other contracting
party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a principal supplying
interest* (which two preceding categories of contracting parties, together with the
applicant contracting party, are in this Article hereinafter referred to as the
"contracting parties primarily concerned"), and subject to consultation with any
other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a
substantial interest* in such concession, modify or withdraw a concession*
included in the appropriate schedule annexed to this Agreement.
Likewise, GATS Art. XXI provides for modification of each members' service schedule:
A Member (referred to in this Article as the "modifying Member") may modify or
withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at any time after three years have
elapsed from the date on which that commitment entered into force, in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.185
However, there is no provision for schedule modification in any other WTO multilateral agreement
like, for example, the TBT or SPS Agreements. In other words, there are no provisions on how
WTO members can unilaterally amend regulatory policies through additional commitments in their
schedules. The WTO Agreement states that an amendment to the Multilateral Trade Agreements
contained in its Annex 1A (WTO Agreement Annex 1A) must meet certain conditions. These
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conditions include the specification of an amendment proposal from a WTO member, consensus
or two-third majority (through voting) for the Ministerial Conference to submit the proposed
amendment to the WTO members for acceptance, and a quorum for implementing such
amendment.186
The contents of the JSIs being negotiated involve amendments to existing rules and new regulatory
matters. To incorporate the proposed JSIs into the WTO, there will be a need for the WTO
Agreement amendment which would require a consensus among WTO members. As such,
assuming the proposed JSIs will be MFN-complaint, the JSIs may still contravene the WTO
Agreement’s multilateralism through failure to adhere to adoption-by-consensus.
On another note, GATS Art. XVIII provides, "Members may negotiate commitments with respect
to measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI [market
access] or XVII [national treatment], including those regarding qualifications, standards or
licensing matters."187
The GATS explicitly provides additional commitments outside market access and national
treatment if such additional commitments relate to trade in services. From the above-quoted
provision on additional commitments, JSIs on Domestic Services Regulation and some provisions
of the E-Commerce relating to trade services could be linked to service schedules because they
address trade in services. Hence, if MFN-compliant, JSI final agreements may be incorporated into
members' service schedules without any difficulty.
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At the moment, with 164 members the WTO Agreement consensus provision for rulemaking and
amendment seems to be cumbersome and insurmountable. As a result, it might be challenging to
achieve a consensus for the JSIs. Are there other ways to incorporate the JSIs into the WTO
Agreement without consensus among the WTO members? Should the WTO members insist on a
strict application of the WTO provisions on amendment vis a vis the JSIs or should they proceed
without consensus and allow the WTO Agreement to evolve and adapt? These questions remain
controversial and debatable among WTO members. The various dilemmas raised by JSIs,
however, profile the continuing need for other forms of agreement that are more traditionally
encountered in WTO negotiations, notably CMAs.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined the WTO Agreement and its predecessor, the GATT 1947, and the
negotiating methods employed in a number of their multilateral negotiation rounds. This chapter
also analyzed some of the WTO Agreement practices and principles, and how they contribute to
the WTO’s current negotiating deadlock.

The negotiating arm of the WTO, and the WTO as a whole has been struggling for a long time
with the Doha Round’s suspension, the failure of those above-mentioned traditional negotiating
methods in a multilateral context, the challenge of achieving specific reciprocity and balanced
concessions exchange among the WTO members in an environment that does not allow for
quantification, the single-undertaking approach problem and the challenge of consensus decisionmaking.188 Attention has been turned to other negotiating methods and formats. As opined by one
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scholar, ““Variable geometry," plurilateral and "critical mass" techniques should be considered.
WTO Members should attempt to accommodate different perspectives and different speeds while
maintaining the overall integrity of the system."189 In addition, on a number of newer issues like
services and those arising from digital technologies and data localization requirements defying
easy quantification, quantitative approaches that are inherent in strictly reciprocal negotiations are
mismatched. Recent areas of concern lend themselves to the adherence to regulatory standards
rather than the achievement of tradeoffs. For these reasons, the next chapter examines the other
means of trade negotiation adopted by WTO members. These include closed and open plurilaterals,
and in particular in the context of the latter, the ‘critical mass’ approach to negotiations in the
WTO.

been doing in the negotiating front. This is how the world sees us. There is no escaping that. It doesn't matter how
much we say that we do more than negotiate, that we have a number of other things going on here, which are extremely
important to the world even though the world doesn't know it. People only see us as good as our progress on Doha.
That is the reality. And the perception in the world is that we have forgotten how to negotiate. The perception is
ineffectiveness. The perception is paralysis. Our failure to address this paralysis casts a shadow which goes well
beyond the negotiating arm, and it covers every other part of our work. It is essential that we breathe new life into
negotiations.” WTO, General Council, Azevêdo Launches "Rolling Set of Meetings" Aimed at Delivering Success in
Bali (9 September 2013), online: WTO <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/gc_09sep13_e.htm>.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. THE CONCEPT
NEGOTIATIONS

OF

'CRITICAL

MASS'

IN

WTO

3.1 Introduction
The 'critical mass' approach to trade negotiations is one of the proposed alternatives to traditional
WTO negotiating formats profiled in earlier chapters. The 'critical mass' method is a form of
negotiating technique that requires agreement among only a subset of WTO members amounting
to a sufficient number – or "critical mass" - of the WTO members in a specific trade or service
sector.
This chapter examines the 'critical mass' negotiating format in the WTO context, the difference
between a CMA and other types of WTO trade negotiating methods agreements, and previous
CMAs negotiated in the WTO. Through the example of prior WTO ‘critical mass' agreements, the
suitability of the critical mass-based negotiating format to present and future trade negotiations in
the WTO will be considered. This chapter will give an explanation that will help to further the
understanding of the 'critical mass' approach in WTO trade negotiations and serve as a foundation
for the thesis' subsequent chapters and conclusion.
3.2 Difference between a CMA and other Forms of WTO Trade Agreements
Members of the WTO have utilized alternatives aside from a critical mass-based approach for trade
negotiation within and outside the WTO framework. These alternatives will be briefly examined,
in particular focusing on how they differ from a CMA.
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3.2.1 Multilateral Trading Agreements
In international law, treaties are a source of law identified in Art. 38(1)(a) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and are classically arranged in three categories: bilateral,
plurilateral and multilateral.190 A bilateral treaty is an agreement between two countries. A
plurilateral treaty is an agreement among a subset of countries. Finally, a multilateral treaty is an
agreement among many or all countries.
The WTO Agreement is a multilateral treaty which extends certain obligations immediately and
unconditionally to the entire WTO membership. However, it also contains within its framework
constituent agreements that are plurilateral (i.e. among a subset of the WTO membership) and
bilateral (i.e. among two members). These plurilateral and bilateral accords within the broad
envelope of the WTO Agreement are often the only realistic way in which agreement on certain
discrete topics like government procurement or technical standards can be reached but can also
serve as ‘kernels’ for wider agreement among the membership in future.
CMAs are similar to multilateral trade agreements because they apply on an MFN basis to all WTO
members. However, CMAs are distinct from multilateral trade agreements in three ways. First,
CMAs do not require reciprocity of concessions among all WTO members. Instead, there is a need
for reciprocity among the "critical mass" of the WTO members in the negotiating group. Second,
CMAs are issue-specific. Unlike the single undertaking principle that requires an agreement on all
cross-linked issues in multilateral trade negotiations, CMAs specifically address a particular
sector. Furthermore, CMAs do not automatically incorporate S&DT principles. Rather than
granting flexibility to developing countries and LDCs as part of the WTO multilateral trade
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agreements, CMAs usually exempt members who are not technically capable of implementing the
trade obligations and extend the benefit of such agreements automatically instead.
3.2.2 Plurilateral Agreements (PAs)
PAs are another type of trade agreement agreed upon among WTO members. Similar to the CMAs,
PAs are sector-specific and allow for the accession of other WTO members. Also, PAs do not have
S&DT provisions. Unlike CMAs that have no statutory provision, Article X:9 of the WTO
Agreement provides for PAs. The CMAs are different from PAs because the former's benefits are
applied on an unconditional MFN basis to other non-signatories, while the latter's benefits are
exclusively limited to participants.191
In addition, the adoption of PAs requires the consensus of all WTO members.192 However, CMAs
do not require a consensus among WTO members before they come into force. One of the reasons
for the consensus requirement for PAs is because PAs limit or exclude non-participants from their
benefits. In other words, the MFN provision does not apply in PAs. Hence, to avoid agreements
that are fragmentary or erode the inclusivity of the WTO Agreement, it is pertinent to make sure
such PAs entered into are not unfair to non-participants and to international trade at large. Like the
multilateral trading system, the PA consensus criterion limits the possibility of negotiating PAs
within the WTO. PAs are found in Annex 4A of the WTO Agreement and include the Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA).193
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3.2.3 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)
PTAs are agreements negotiated and agreed upon outside the WTO framework. The GATT 1994
Art. XXIV foresees the negotiation of PTAs among members of "custom unions" or "free trade
areas."194 PTAs are negotiated based on the criteria or standards set by countries that agree to
negotiate a PTA. Like PAs, PTAs apply on a non-MFN basis. In contrast to CMAs and PAs, PTAs
do not have an accession clause. In most instances PTAs do not foresee that other countries that
were not part of the original negotiation and adoption process will join later. In addition, PTAs
may not be sector-specific, as in the case of PAs and CMAs. PTAs may involve varying issues and
commitments. An example of a PTA is the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA),195 formerly known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)196,
between the US, Canada, and Mexico. The USMCA addresses several issues, including digital
trade, environment, financial services, intellectual property, and others that are not expressly dealt
with in the WTO Agreement.197 In addition, no other country can accede to the USMCA.
3.3 Status of a CMA in the WTO
As indicated, WTO members have adopted several modalities to trade negotiations under the WTO
Agreement. Unlike other mentioned trade negotiation methods, the critical mass-based negotiating
type is not agreed upon by consensus. Rather, the agreement comes about because a critical mass
of member countries agree to disciplines in a certain area or subject and these benefits are extended
to other members who are not part of the critical mass.
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What is the legal status of a CMA in the WTO? Does the WTO Agreement explicitly or impliedly
provide for the 'critical mass' negotiating method? As mentioned, a CMA is not expressly provided
for in the WTO Agreement or other agreements negotiated under WTO auspices, although as will
be discussed, a number of agreements achieved within the WTO framework were concluded on
the basis of critical mass considerations.
Like the argument for JSIs, GATT 1994 and the GATS provides for modification of members’
schedules on goods and services as well as regulatory issues on services without a consensus.198
Thus, the CMA can be said to derive its status from these WTO Agreements. In addition, one of
the GATT/WTO tenets is to ensure inclusivity. An overarching aim is to create a legal framework
that encourages inclusiveness, transparency and eliminates discriminatory practices among its
members. As existing CMAs discussed below will show, in pursuit of these objectives CMAs are
open and applied on an MFN basis to all WTO members despite the fact that only some members
are prepared to make commitments. With the inclusion of the MFN principle in CMAs, it can be
argued that open plurilaterals (CMAs) meet well the principle of inclusivity and are legally
consistent with the tenets of the WTO multilateral trading system.
Since CMAs align with the WTO core principles, is CMA a suitable alternative to all WTO present
and future trade negotiations? As will be discussed, the 'critical mass' approach to negotiation,
although a feasible solution for some WTO multilateral negotiating challenges and contexts, is not
appropriate for every negotiating issue.
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3.4 What is the 'Critical Mass' Threshold?
The question of what constitutes a 'critical mass' in the negotiation of a CMA under the WTO has
been a subject of long-standing debate. Put differently, what exactly is the threshold required for
negotiating a CMA? For Patrick, "apart from the possibility of a ground rule about a certain
minimum level of membership engagement required to embark on a 'critical mass' initiative, an
obvious question is who decides that a 'critical mass' has been attained. The simplest answer is that
the 'critical mass' defines itself."199
For Vickers, the 'critical mass' criteria will need to be developed openly and transparently (for
example, 80–90% share of world trade in a specific product or sector). 200 Hufbauer adds that a
'critical mass' has typically been defined to include countries accounting for 90% or more of world
trade in the particular sector; however, the threshold test for inclusion in the WTO framework
should be "substantial coverage" of world trade or production in the affected sector.201
From commentators' opinions, it is evident that there is no agreed threshold for a 'critical mass'
necessary to negotiate and successfully conclude a CMA. It is safe to assume that a 'critical mass'
threshold should be determined specifically according to each trade negotiation's particular
circumstances. A breakdown of CMAs successfully negotiated within the GATT/WTO will also
be conducted to explain the subjectivity of the 'critical mass' threshold.
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3.5 Features of a 'Critical Mass' Negotiating Approach
A critical mass-based approach has been applied in negotiating existing WTO trade agreements.
What are the features of CMAs? What are the factors attributed to some of the WTO previous
CMAs? In determining whether a CMA suitable for a WTO negotiation, a number of questions
must be cumulatively answered in the affirmative:
•

whether assembling a 'critical mass' is possible.

•

whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure or other
means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.

•

whether the resulting critical mass is high enough and commands adequate institutional power
in the concerned trade sector.

•

whether the issue of free-ridership is non-consequential.

The above-mentioned questions make up the characteristics implicit in a CMA negotiating type.
An examination of these issues of CMAs will be conducted below and existing WTO CMAs will
be examined through their historical negotiating process together with the CMA characteristics
enumerated above. At the end of this chapter, previous WTO CMAs will be broken down further
to understand the WTO 'critical mass' negotiating method.
3.5.1 Whether assembling a 'critical mass' is possible
For a 'critical mass' negotiating method to be adopted in a trade sector, the possibility of assembling
a 'critical mass' should be feasible. The WTO Agreement was concluded to facilitate the flow of
cross-border trade among its members. As a result, negotiations in the WTO are mostly about
eliminating trade barriers, furthering its trade liberalization goals and members' commercial
interests. The benefits of opening a domestic sector to international level is one of the incentives
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for WTO members engaging in trade negotiations. With these benefits in mind, WTO members
may be convinced to make specific commitments in different sectors and, in return, achieve freer
trade in a trade sector.
As the experience of previous WTO CMAs will show, achieving a 'critical mass' was possible
because of the trade liberalization benefits involved. For a CMA to be suitable for trade agreement
negotiation, the starting point may be evaluating whether there are trade benefits that would
encourage WTO members to participate in such negotiation in the form of a 'critical mass.' This,
of course, presumes a benefit arises for both sides in any reciprocal exchange of concessions.
However, it must also be asked whether it is possible to assemble a 'critical mass' for an agreement
that is purely reciprocal and limitative – such as in the case of subsidies – where the aim of the
agreement is to regulate behaviour or limit countries' activities? Chapter 4 of this thesis will
examine that question.
3.5.2 Whether there is a "champion" country willing to use the threat of market closure or
other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
A precondition in the 'critical mass' negotiating method is the presence of a/some willing WTO
member(s) to spearhead the CMA negotiation. This "champion(s)" should be a WTO member who
is also capable of using the threat of market closure or any other means to extract more significant
commitments from other members in a specified sector.202
A commentator states that in determining a suitable alternative to traditional negotiating methods,
"… there is at least one precondition: the existence of a core group of Members that would mobilize
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the expertise and political energy needed for such a project, and their readiness to reach mutually
acceptable outcomes."203 In other words, there must be the existence of a major participant(s) with
some level of dominance in the particular trade sector that can initiate discussions and has the
capacity to strongarm other WTO members to make significant commitments in a CMA-type
arrangement in a specific sector. This instills the discipline necessary to get the negotiations
completed.
3.5.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high enough and commands adequate
institutional power in the concerned trade sector
For a CMA type of negotiation to be successful, the resulting 'critical mass' of participants should
be high enough to command adequate institutional power in the particular sector. Wolfe explains
that "a critical mass thus has two dimensions: on a given issue, the Members with the bulk of
material power are essential players, yet they will be stymied if the process does not also have the
legitimacy that comes with a critical mass of institutional power."204
Still, the notion of legitimacy cannot be easily defined as it is viewed from different lenses
including from sociological, political, psychological, and legal perspectives. In the WTO,
legitimacy takes on varying aspects. It ranges from the legitimacy of representation, legality,
openness, and transparency (internal and external transparency) among WTO members at the
negotiation, adoption, and implementation stages.205 Srivastava opines:
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To summarise, legitimacy of an inter-national organization [WTO] emanates from
a combination of factors encapsulating broad concepts such as democracy,
participation, representation, accountability, transparency and in addition,
functional efficiency or its capacity to fulfil its mandate. Besides, for any political
entity including inter-national organization, legitimacy is a process which is not
static but is in a continuous process of evolution/accumulation (even dissipation),
which is difficult to quantify and more often a matter of perception.206
Since this thesis is concerned with the negotiating process of a CMA, the legitimacy for adequate
institutional power required in a CMA arrangement will be analyzed from the point of its
transparency, openness, and representation of all WTO members.
The transparency criterion mandates that all interested WTO members should be privy to every
meeting, formal or informal, consultation and review process in a CMA negotiation. While
openness posits that a CMA negotiation should be open-ended, every interested WTO member
should be able to join the negotiation at any stage. Representation suggests that a CMA negotiation
should not be limited to a subset or ‘club’ in the WTO. Rather, it should ensure participation that
showcases a sort of broad geographical interest of WTO members from every region in the
concerned sector.
Institutional power implies the indirect influence of an actor within an institution as a result of the
institution's design.207 As explained, the WTO operates on the basis of a consensus decisionmaking principle. Thus, every WTO member possesses and exerts institutional power/indirect
influence on the ambit of agreements negotiated in the WTO. As a result, for a CMA to possess
the necessary institutional power it has to garner a high number (critical mass) of WTO members
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in the sector concerned through a legitimate means. How then does a negotiation gather a
significant number of participants?
Assembling a ‘critical mass’ in a CMA requires two groups of participants. First, there is a need
to have major trading partners in the specific sector as participants in the proposed CMA. Unlike
in the GATT 1947 era when the WTO membership was limited and negotiations were between the
largest players, majorly the Quad countries (US EU, Japan, and Canada), today there is an increase
in the numbers of power 'blocs' within the WTO stymying the emergence of a consensus. Emerging
developing countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are no
longer inclined to defer uncritically to the hegemony of the founding members who constituted the
original Quad.208 Wolfe adds that although the Quad countries still include the largest markets,
they can no longer supply systemic leadership alone without the joinder of emerging markets.209
As a result of the shift in power balance, it is pertinent to have emerging economies actively
involved in a CMA negotiation, together with the Quad countries, because of the former’s large
markets in several trade sectors.
Second, there is a need to have a substantial number of WTO members participate in the
negotiations if the 'critical mass' negotiating method is to succeed in the WTO. Every additional
WTO member country contributes to the level of institutional power a negotiated result agreement
may have. Hence, the higher the number of participants in a CMA negotiation, the higher the
resulting 'critical mass', the higher the combined institutional power that can grant legitimacy to
the agreement’s negotiation and adoption.
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To get the legitimate high number of participants in a CMA arrangement, it is necessary to make
the CMA negotiating process open and transparent to all WTO members without limitation. In
addition to openness and transparency, a CMA negotiation should be inclusive, ensuring fair
representation by considering the needs of interested WTO members in the sector concerned. If a
CMA negotiation involves the concerns of both developed and developing countries, more WTO
members may be willing to participate in the negotiation, and in the end, a ‘critical mass’ of
participants can be assembled legitimately.
As a result, a CMA may only be a suitable alternative when the 'critical mass' involves both WTO
members with significant market shares and a large majority of countries in the specified sector.
When these participants (significant markets and a substantial majority of WTO members) are
present, the resulting 'critical mass' may be high enough to command the required institutional
power.
How is the 'critical mass' then determined? As previously indicated, the 'critical mass' threshold
has not been calibrated with any absolute number, although the inclusion of countries with a market
share of 80-90% is not uncommon. At the same time, as experience with previous CMAs will
show, the 'critical mass' threshold is calculated chiefly with regard to the peculiarities in each
sector.
3.5.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
As explained, a 'critical mass' negotiating approach requires that concessions and benefits from
such a CMA be extended unconditionally to all WTO members on an MFN basis. The MFN
provisions distinguish an 'open' plurilateral or CMA from a more traditional 'closed' plurilateral
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such as the GPA, where benefits are only extended to signatories.210 The purpose for the MFN
requirement in a CMA was explained by the Warwick Commission as follows:
In the name of justice and fairness, the principle of non-discrimination should apply
to all Members, regardless of whether they participate in 'critical mass'
agreements. To the extent that benefits do not only accrue as a direct result of
obligations, the idea is that non-signatories benefit from a non-discriminatory
application by signatories of the provisions of an agreement as well as access to
benefits arising from the agreement.211
However, the MFN clause in a 'critical mass'-type trade negotiation opens it up to the possibility
of free-ridership. As mentioned, the problem of free-ridership refers to beneficiaries of
commitments that do not 'pay for them' or offer anything in return. If widespread enough, freeridership can act as a disincentive to achieving any agreement at all. The issue of free-ridership
has been a persistent challenge in trade negotiations from the GATT 1947 era onwards to the
present date. The extent of 'free ridership' is another determinant of the suitability of a 'critical
mass' approach to trade negotiations in the WTO.
A CMA denotes a self-sustaining agreement. Aside from the 'critical mass' of participants in a
CMA in allowing members to command institutional power in the WTO, the 'critical mass' in the
sector concerned also reduces the adverse effect of free-ridership. In other words, there should be
a 'critical mass' of participants in a specific sector whose commitments will ensure that the absence
of some countries from obligations does not erode the participants' interests and benefits. When a
'critical mass' is met in a CMA, free-ridership will not pose a threat to the negotiation or impede
the overall benefit of the agreement.
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In addition, although the 'critical mass' criterion counters to some extent the free-ridership problem
by ensuring that enough participants are already offering significant commitments, the extent to
which 'free riders' should be allowed to benefit from a CMA remains a controversial point.
The success of a critical mass-type negotiating approach hinges on affirmative answers to all the
points mentioned above. Previous WTO CMAs will now be analyzed to elucidate the features of
a critical mass-based approach to trade agreement negotiations in the WTO.
3.6 ‘Critical Mass’ Approaches in Previous WTO Agreements
3.6.1 The WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
3.6.1.1 Introduction
The ITA was the first sector-specific tariff liberalization agreement negotiated after the UR. 29
countries launched the ITA during the Singapore MC on 13 December 1996.212 The ITA came into
force on 1 April 1997, eliminating tariffs on IT products with a zero-for-zero tariff reduction
formula among 40 countries to be achieved within three years (1997-2000).

3.6.1.2 Description of the WTO ITA Negotiation Process
3.6.1.2.1 The UR ITA Negotiation
A proposal for sectoral negotiation on certain IT products started with the US during the UR.213
The US initiative originally proposed “zero-for-zero” tariffs on electronics, with the aim of
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ensuring full trade liberalization in some IT products.214 The US proposal did not go far during the
UR because the EU, in particular, did not join a sectoral initiative on electronics.215 However, at
the end of the UR, industrialized countries agreed to a 50 percent elimination of tariffs on some
electronic products (excluding consumer electronic products).216

3.6.1.2.2 Post-UR ITA Negotiation
Following a lack of success in negotiations for a zero-for-zero tariff on IT products during the UR,
US IT manufacturers in the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) developed a “Proposal
for Tariff Elimination” in 1995.217 The ITI proposal projected a plurilateral Information
Technology Agreement to eliminate tariffs on hardware and software by 2000.218 The ITI then
worked with other IT sectors seeking to build a constituency for liberalization by eliminating trade
barriers to their products.219

The ITI worked with other IT trade groups, including the European Association of Manufacturers
of Business Machines and Information Technology Industry (EUROBIT), the Japanese Electronic
Development Association (JEDA) and the Information Technology Association of Canada
(ITAC). As a result, these IT firms jointly proposed an initiative at the G-7 Ministerial Conference
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held in Brussels in February 1995.220 Their proposal suggested eliminating customs duties on IT
products that would contribute to enhancing the global information infrastructure by 2000.221
Support for an ITA was later endorsed by the EU and US business groups taking part in the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD).222 Other Quad countries, including Canada and Japan, also
agreed to the ITA initiative. The idea was that a consensus among the Quad countries would
encourage other WTO members to join in the proposed ITA.

After a consensus was achieved among the Quad countries on the matter, the US noted that the
Quad countries' participation was necessary but was not sufficient to adopt an ITA because of any
agreement’s MFN application.

In order to bring other WTO members on board in the ITA negotiation the Quad countries began
to extend negotiation towards other countries. The Asian region was of particular importance
because it had a large IT market and was a major source of IT product export. To involve the Asian
countries, including China and Taiwan that were the two key-IT producing countries in the ITA
negotiations, the Quad countries introduced the ITA initiative on the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) platform during the 1996 APEC Trade Ministers Meeting.223
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In October 1996, the Quad countries and other WTO members, especially Asian electronics
exporters, began to negotiate the contents and modalities of the ITA initiative in order to
accommodate the concerns of developing countries.224 The developed countries’ chief interest was
to encourage developing countries to participate and provide significant commitments in the ITA.
At one point, the US agreed to some flexibility in the product coverage and tariff cuts
implementation, with limits, to expand the ITA initiative country coverage. At a WTO informal
meeting in 1996 US emphasized that countries with a lot to gain in the proposed ITA should be
part of the negotiations and that the negotiation was open to every interested WTO member. 225
After some of the developing countries’ IT products were listed as part of the proposed ITA in
November 1996, the APEC countries agreed the ITA initiative should “substantially eliminate”
tariffs on information technology products by 2000.226

At the Singapore MC in December 1996, the US and a number of WTO members wanted the ITA
announced before the meeting ended.227 In order to achieve this goal, US and the EU held several
bilateral discussions during the Ministerial. As a result, trade negotiators eventually reached a
provisional agreement on 11 December 1996. The provisional agreement was signed by the trade
ministers of the US, EU, Japan, and Canada.228 Afterwards, the signed agreement was circulated
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among all WTO members. Finally, on 13 December 1996, the ITA was formally launched through
a "Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology", with 29 countries signatory.229
The ITA Ministerial Declaration stated that tariff cuts on IT products would apply on an MFN
basis. However, to avoid the free-ridership problem participating countries agreed that the ITA
would not come into force until it achieved 90 percent coverage in world trade of listed IT
products.230 The ITA itself could not enter into force when it was formally launched because the
participants only represented 80 percent of the coverage threshold.
Annex 4 of the ITA Ministerial Declaration provided that participants would meet no later than 1
April 1997 to review the "state of acceptances received" and the associated implementation process
of the ITA to determine if a 90 percent threshold had been met. Between the 1996 Singapore MC
and the 1997 scheduled meeting, the ITA participants continued to meet extensively. However,
some IT markets, including Thailand, New Zealand and the Philippines, had still not joined the
ITA. Thailand, India, Norway and Malaysia maintained that they would sign the ITA before the
April 1997 deadline only if there were major additions to the IT products list. On the other hand,
the Quad countries were not willing to significantly alter the ITA’s product coverage. The success
of the ITA turned on more membership, especially on more Asian countries. To achieve this, the
Quad countries eventually agreed that a longer phasing-out period could be agreed to for certain
IT products. On 9 March 1997, 9 countries, including Malaysia, India, Thailand, and the
Philippines, agreed to join the ITA.
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Ahead of the April 1997 meeting, participating countries held an informal meeting in March 1997.
At the informal meeting, the WTO Secretariat’s calculations showed that the approved 25
schedules of 40 participants accounted for more than 92 percent of world trade in the sector. 231
Following this determination participating countries approved the implementation of the ITA text.
The ITA then came into force on 1 April 1997 and its benefits were immediately applied on an
MFN basis to non-participants in the WTO.

According to commentators, one reason for the success of the ITA was that the ITA was to a certain
degree cross-sectoral because the final ITA was concluded when the US agreed to lower its barriers
to European liquor exports.232 EU negotiators insisted on tariff phase-out for brown and white
distilled spirits and liqueurs in exchange for phasing out EU tariffs on IT products on a similar
schedule, a condition that the US agreed to.233 Hence, achieving a critical mass was important to
the ITA’s conclusion but also involved concessions among major players inter se.
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3.6.1.2.3 Post-ITA Negotiation Process
The number of ITA participants has increased over time. In 1997, the ITA accounted for 92 percent
of world trade in the IT sector.234 The ITA participants have now increased in number to 82 and
now account for 96 percent of world trade in listed IT products.235

According to one commentator, a contributory factor to the increase in the number of the ITA
participants is that countries' WTO accessions have been predicated on ITA acceptance. 236 For
instance, China and Vietnam joined the ITA as part of their WTO accession processes. New
signatories from Central America also joined as a condition of free trade agreements they
negotiated with the US237
The ITA was recently expanded to include additional IT products in December 2015.238 The ITA's
expansion similarly imposes a 90 percent coverage threshold before an "ITA2" should come into
force. To curb free-ridership, the ITA2's Declaration provides that a committee is to be set up to
examine the scope of coverage if there is a shift in trade that may affect its 'critical mass.'239 In
other words, if current free-riders become major IT markets in future, ITA participants will ensure
they make substantial commitments in the ITA2 to limit any free-ridership effect. In addition,
although ITA participants intend to expand the ITA to include non-tariff measures like subsidies
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to an IT producer,240 this proposed expansion has proved too difficult to negotiate through a
binding agreement.241 As a result, the ITA2 only covers IT products and not non-tariff issues
specifically related to IT products.242

3.6.1.3 The ITA as a CMA
How did the ITA conform with CMA requirements? The following section provides an assessment
of the ITA negotiation vis-à-vis the required features of a CMA.
3.6.1.3.1 Whether assembling a 'critical mass' is possible.
Gathering a 'critical mass' in the ITA negotiation was possible in the case of the ITA because when
the ITA was initiated the IT industry was a "highly globalized" one and there was keen competition
among countries to attract foreign investment in the IT industry.243 Most WTO members were
interested in the IT industry. The hope of further liberalization of the IT market for everyone's
benefit encouraged WTO members to continue the ITA’s negotiation until it was concluded.
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3.6.1.3.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure
or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
As mentioned, the original proposal for sectoral negotiation on certain IT products emanated from
the US244 The US was the "champion" that led other WTO members in the ITA initiative
negotiation. Also, the US was not just a "champion"; as indicated, it was the most advanced
country at the time in the WTO and therefore could make significant market access threats or
convince other WTO members to join in the ITA negotiations.

Although it is not entirely clear if the US threatened market access closure during the ITA
negotiation, its influence and contribution could be seen all through the negotiating period. With
the US, other Quad countries also participated actively in the ITA negotiation at all stages to ensure
a successful ITA.245

3.6.1.3.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate institutional
power in the concerned trade sector
In ensuring that the ‘critical mass’ gathered is significant enough to command adequate
institutional power in the WTO, attention was given to WTO members with significant IT markets,
especially Asian countries.246

In addition, to generate the required number of participant countries that could command
legitimate institutional power in the IT sector, the ITA negotiation was always open to all interested
WTO members. At the initial negotiating stage, APEC members were allowed to give opinions
about the ITA initiative and its product coverage.247 APEC countries noted that the ITA product
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coverage and modalities should consider the development status of developing countries by
accommodating the needs of developing countries in the proposed IT list.248 Some developing
countries wanted certain IT products excluded while other countries pressed to include other IT
products in the IT products coverage list.249 Prior to the Singapore MC some developing country
needs were considered and included in the proposed ITA product lists before a final ITA was
circulated to all WTO members at the Singapore Ministerial.250

In addition, the ITA Ministerial Declaration specifically stated that the ITA was open to every
interested WTO member. In furtherance of this posture, after the ITA Ministerial Declaration,
WTO members and countries or customs territories in the process of acceding to the WTO were
enjoined to join the informal meetings following up between 17-31 January 1997.251 WTO
members continued to review the IT products coverage list and other related issues until the ITA
was concluded in April 1997. Although the EU and US led the negotiating process, the ITA product
coverage was a joint work from all WTO members interested in the ITA negotiation.
From the resources accessed in this thesis, it appears that all meetings conducted after the Quad
countries agreed on the ITA initiative were transparent and open to all WTO members at each
stage of the ITA negotiations until the final agreement was concluded. Furthermore, the inclusive
nature of the negotiating process ensured widespread participation and is one reason why the
required critical mass in the IT sector was achievable.
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How was the required ‘critical mass’ calculated for the ITA? The Quad countries had a specific
list of IT products included in the ITA.252 At the time the necessary 'critical mass' threshold was to
be determined that threshold was calculable because tariffs on goods such as IT products were
quantifiable and predictable. Furthermore, the ITA Ministerial Declaration specifically stated that
the 90 percent threshold required for the ITA negotiation to come into force should be calculated
by the WTO Secretariat.253 This percentage was to be calculated by the WTO Secretariat based on
the most recent data available at the final meeting.254

When the ITA came into force on 1 April 1997, 92 percent of world trade in the IT sector made
significant ITA commitments in their schedules.255 Participants representing the 92 percent
threshold encompassed major IT suppliers and almost all WTO members with IT markets. This
overwhelming majority represents the necessary ‘critical mass’ that commanded institutional
power in the IT sector for the ITA to come into force.

3.6.1.3.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
As mentioned, the ITA was to be extended to other countries without requiring reciprocal
commitments from them.256 As such, ITA participants agreed that the ITA would not enter into
force unless a 90 percent threshold was met.257 In the end, more than 92 percent of the world trade
in the IT sector significantly committed to the ITA.258 The absence of other WTO members did
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not matter because the 90 percent threshold adopted in the ITA negotiation obviated the freeridership concern.

3.6.2 WTO Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA)
3.6.2.1 Introduction
The BTA is a sector-specific agreement that was negotiated and adopted outside the UR. The BTA
is now annexed as the Fourth Protocol to the GATS.259 The BTA entered into force on 5 February
1998 after 69 members representing over 90 percent of world telecommunications revenue had
joined.260 The BTA bound signatories to open their telecom markets either immediately or subject
to a phased time frame.261

The BTA applies on an MFN basis as provided in GATS Art. II. However, because service
coverage was a new feature of the WTO Agreement with potentially unforeseen consequences, the
GATS allows for MFN exemptions.262 This possibility is provided for in the "Annex on Article II
Exemptions.”263

During the GATS negotiations, developed countries, particularly the US, noted that applying an
MFN principle without a substantive commitment from major developing countries might leave
developed countries' markets at a disadvantage in terms of a lack of reciprocal commitment. For
this reason, at the end of the UR the US secured a provision in the GATS that allowed countries
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to make limited exceptions to MFN treatment with respect to service. These negotiations resulted
in GATS Article II (MFN) Exemptions and limitations on National Treatment as envisaged in
GATS Art. XVI:2.264 Hence, the GATS application of the MFN principle concerning "market
access" and "national treatment" is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, with a view to
countries' Schedules of Commitments and MFN Exemptions.265

3.6.2.2 Description of the WTO BTA Negotiation Process
3.6.2.2.1 The UR BTA Negotiation
The forum for international telecommunications negotiations was initially the International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU"). The ITU, established in 1865, was employed by national
governments only to discuss technical issues, such as radio frequency allocation, in a bid to achieve
harmonization among governments in telecommunication services.266 During the early 1980s, US
telecommunications providers wanted to expand into other countries' telecommunication markets
because the US was the most advanced telecommunications market. However, because other
countries' telecommunication markets were often dominated by de facto government or private
monopolies that could frustrate the efforts of foreign entrants and breed anti-competitiveness, the
US resolved to open its market only if there was reciprocity of similar size from other markets.267
This demand gave rise to the need for a 'critical mass' as the basis for the BTA. As a result, the US
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would not agree to a telecommunication agreement except when there existed a "sufficiently large
number of market access commitments from its trading partners.”268

Besides US eagerness for global market access, competition in the telecommunication sector also
grew among industrialized countries.269 Growing competition resulted in pressure for market
access and a reevaluation of national monopolies in the telecommunication sector.270

In 1986, developed countries proposed negotiating an agreement in the telecommunication sector
at a global level akin to the GATT. As a result, they began a process of global outreach on the
subject. Global outreach was necessary because developed countries wanted an international
framework and perceived that the GATT negotiating mechanisms were more suitable than the
ITU. This sentiment arose because the all-embracing nature of WTO commitments in many sectors
meant there was a greater chance of achieving their desired result through the GATT platform's
ability to promote cross-sectoral deals.271 Developed countries also contemplated that introducing
competitiveness and the advent of private suppliers of telecommunication services through the
ITU might be regarded as running against the traditional spirit of cooperation the ITU was known
for.272 In addition, developed countries sensed that developing countries had a strong influence in
the ITU and they might be less amenable to an agreement if negotiations proceeded under the ITU.
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For these reasons, developed countries pushed for negotiations over telecommunication services
in the UR.

Towards the end of the UR negotiations, it became evident that an agreement on basic telecoms
and some other sectors, including financial and maritime services, could not be concluded in
parallel with conclusions reached on other issues.273 As a result, the UR participating countries
agreed that talks on a WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services should continue
after the UR ended. Accordingly, at the signing of the WTO Agreement trade ministers adopted
the Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications to extend the basic
telecommunications agreement negotiation beyond the UR until 30 April 1996.274

The 1994 Ministerial Decision on Basic Telecommunications provided for the establishment of an
ad hoc group, “Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunication” (NGBT), to carry on with the
post-UR basic telecommunications agreement negotiations.275 The 1994 Ministerial Decision on
Basic Telecommunications stated that continuing negotiations on telecommunication services
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would be open to every interested WTO member on a voluntary basis with a view to the
progressive liberalization of trade in telecommunications networks and services.276

In addition, the 1994 Ministerial Decision on Basic Telecommunications included a standstill
commitment by countries that every participant country was to refrain from applying any trade
measure that might affect trade in basic telecommunication services in a way that would improve
its negotiating position and leverage.277

Furthermore, the WTO Agreement included an Annex on Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications.278 The purpose of the Annex was to suspend GATS Art II on MFN
application in the telecommunication sector until the date to be stated by a projected BTA or 30
April 1996 if no BTA was reached.279 Also, the Annex extended the duration for filing exemptions
to GATS Article II (MFN treatment) in the telecommunications sector on the same basis.280

3.6.2.2.2 Post-UR BTA Negotiation
After the UR negotiations ended in April 1994 the NGBT continued negotiations on basic
telecommunication services. The US spearheaded the basic telecommunication services
negotiations because it was the most advanced country in terms of telecommunications
liberalization at the time.281 The NGBT resolved not to have a fixed list of what constituted basic
telecommunications services but agreed that the talks would "include … all telecommunications
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services that involve real-time transmission of customer-supplied information (i.e. without adding
value)." 282

As the April 1996 deadline for achieving agreement drew near, the US withdrew its offer of open
satellite market access.283 It was not encouraged by offers on telecommunications market access
and national treatment made by most developing countries, especially the ASEAN countries, India,
and Latin America.284 The US was also not satisfied with the quality of offers on investment
limitations, international traffic, and satellite services issues.285
In connection with its market access withdrawal, the US expressly stated that a ‘critical mass’ of
offers of "sufficient quantity and sufficient quality” had not been reached.286 According to the US,
“over 40% of world telecom revenues and over 34% of global international traffic are not covered
by acceptable offers. We will not enter an agreement on these terms.”287 The US noted that it
would conclude a basic telecommunication services agreement only when a "critical mass" of
offers was achieved and urged other participants to improve their offers.

As the original April 1996 negotiating deadline approached, the NGBT, in a bid to control the
situation, agreed to the proposal of the then WTO DG Renato Ruggiero to extend the timeline for
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the adoption of both the Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications and the Annex
on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications. The NGBT then transmitted its final report to the
Council on Trade in Services.288 The NGBT Report of 30 April 1996 included Schedules of
Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions listed together with a draft “Fourth Protocol to
the General Agreement on Trade in Services"289 and a “Decision on Commitments in Basic
Telecommunications.”290

The WTO Council on Trade in Services adopted the NGBT final report on 30 April 1996 and
extended the Basic Telecoms Negotiation deadline to 15 February 1997. 291 The GATS Fourth
Protocol annexed WTO members’ Schedules of Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions
concerning Basic Telecommunications.292 The Decision on Commitments in Basic
Telecommunications adopted on 30 April 1996 adopted the text of the Fourth Protocol and its
annex. The 1996 Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications also provided a 30-day
period in January-February 1997 during which members that had listed Schedules of
Commitments might supplement or modify their schedules of Article II exemptions.293
Alternatively, WTO members that had not submitted lists of GATS Art. II exemptions could do
so within the 30-day period. 294
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After the April 1996 deadline, the NGBT was replaced by the Group on Basic Telecommunications
("GBT"). The GBT was open to all WTO members as participants, unlike the NGBT, where some
countries were participants and other observers.295

Between April 1996 and mid-February 1997 countries continued to improve their offers and
commitments.296 The US also retracted its market access restriction and increased its offers as an
enticement to other countries. The GBT meeting on 14 February 1997 revealed significant changes
in members' offers.297 The US also noted the improved offers and eventually agreed that the
‘critical mass’ of offers of 90 percent needed to achieve an agreement on basic telecommunications
services had been met.298
At the final GBT meeting on 15 February 1997, the GBT adopted a list of participants’
schedules.299 The new list of participants’ schedules was to replace the ones adopted on April 30,
1996.300 The schedules of the signatories were attached as the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. The
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Fourth Protocol entered into force on 5 February 1998 and is now generally known as the WTO
BTA.

At the 15 February 1997 meeting, the then WTO DG Renato Ruggiero emphasized the importance
of the social and economic benefits that would be derived from the BTA and the role that
liberalization in the basic telecommunication sector could have in promoting growth and
development in a globalized world.301 He also noted that the BTA could enhance the human aspect
of globalization by making information and knowledge more accessible. 302
BTA participants have now increased from 69 to 108 WTO members.303 Like the case of the WTO
ITA, it is generally believed that an increase in membership of the WTO BTA is a result of WTO
accessions.304 Accession to the WTO by new members requires that the newly acceding member
accept all agreements adopted before the accession including the BTA. As such, participation in
CMAs increases as the WTO membership increases.

3.6.2.3 The BTA as a CMA
With the historical account of the BTA negotiation provided, this section will attempt to assess the
agreement alongside the required features of a CMA. This assessment will illustrate how the WTO
BTA qualifies as a CMA.
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3.6.2.3.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible
As mentioned, the BTA is a service agreement regulated by the GATS.305 Again, like the ITA, the
BTA was focused on trade liberalization, in this case in the telecommunications sector. The
concluded BTA opened up national telecommunications sectors to foreign direct investment across
the border, bringing more revenue for WTO members and providing employment worldwide.306
The focus on these gains was one reason why gathering a 'critical mass' was possible. In the end,
69 members representing over 90 percent of world telecommunications revenue finalized the
BTA.307
3.6.2.3.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure
or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
The US proposed the BTA.308 It assumed the “champion” role in BTA negotiations. Throughout
the negotiation, from the UR through the post-UR period until adoption, the US played a
leadership role in ensuring the BTA's success. When the US was not satisfied with other
participating countries' offers, especially developing countries, it insisted on no deal and withdrew
some of its initial offers.309 During that time, the NGBT Chair was successful in preserving the
existing commitments and in pushing for an extension of the BTA negotiation deadline.310
It is arguably correct to state that because the US had the most advanced telecommunications
market at the time, its temporary market access withdrawal forced other members to improve on
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their offers and commitments. In addition, after the first post-UR deadline extension the US
retracted its offer on market restrictions to incentivize other countries to make better
commitments.311 Eventually, other participating countries improved on their offers and a BTA
was successfully negotiated.
From the BTA’s negotiating history, it is clear that at every point of the negotiation there was a
“champion” ready to hold the reins of the negotiations together and prevent the thwarting of BTA
negotiation efforts.

3.6.2.3.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate institutional
power in the concerned trade sector
As indicated, one part of assembling a 'critical mass' that commands the necessary institutional
power is in assembling the major trading partners that can negotiate a self-sustaining agreement
on behalf of all WTO members in a specific sector. Thus, in order to satisfy the first criterion of a
high resulting critical mass, the BTA negotiations strove to involve emerging economies with
significant telecommunications markets in the negotiating process.312 The participation of these
emerging economies helped to ensure satisfaction of an important criterion for assembling the
'critical mass' that gave institutional impetus to the BTA negotiation in the telecommunications
sector.
In addition, to ensure the legitimacy of the resulting ‘critical mass', Quad countries pushed for an
open and transparent negotiation that would involve every WTO member with a
telecommunication service market. As a result, the 1994 Decision on Basic Telecommunication
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expressly stated that the BTA negotiation would be open to every WTO member that volunteered
to join.313 The NGBT meetings held between May 1994 and April 1996 were accessible by every
WTO member interested as participants or observers.314 After the NGBT’s replacement with the
GBT, the BTA’s negotiation was open to all WTO members with no limitation.315 All interested
WTO members were allowed to participate and make suggestions at every meeting regarding the
BTA negotiation.316 The inclusiveness at every stage of the BTA negotiation encouraged as many
WTO members interested in the negotiation as possible to gather a legitimate “critical mass”.

If participation in the BTA had been limited to a particular "club" or if developing countries were
not involved – as in the case of the Tokyo Round "side codes" - the resulting 'critical mass' may
not have been sufficient to command the necessary, legitimate institutional power on behalf of all
WTO member in the telecommunication sector. For instance, it is noteworthy that the Quad
countries, mainly, US, EC, and Japan, were reported to accrue 75 percent of world
telecommunication revenue during the BTA negotiation.317 An agreement that consisted of only
the Quad group without other WTO members might be regarded as self-sustaining. However, such
an agreement might not be regarded as having achieved quite the high 'critical mass' that would
give the BTA legitimate institutional power in the WTO telecommunication sector.

How was the BTA' critical mass' determined? The BTA entered into force on 5 February 1998,
after a substantial 69 members representing 92 percent of world telecommunications revenue had
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joined. Like tariffs, revenues accrued in the telecommunications sector for WTO members are
calculable and quantifiable. As a result, determining the necessary 'critical mass' for the BTA was
possible. The 92 percent of world telecommunication revenue represents almost all WTO members
in the basic telecommunication sector. Therefore, the BTA gathered the necessary ‘critical mass’
that commanded required institutional power in the telecommunication sector.

3.6.2.3.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
As indicated, the 'critical mass' threshold in a CMA is vital for two reasons. First, to ensure a
resulting high number that will grant the CMA in question of legitimacy. Second, a 'critical mass'
is necessary to reduce the temptation of free-ridership. For example, to avoid the issue of freeridership in the BTA the US noted that a 'critical mass' of offers of "sufficient quantity and
sufficient quality” needed to be met.318 At the 14 February 1997 meeting, the WTO Secretariat and
the US confirmed that the 'critical mass' required for the BTA negotiation and adoption had been
met.319 Having achieved coverage of more than 90 percent of the world's basic telecommunication
revenue from the participants' commitments, free-ridership in the basic telecommunication sector
was discouraged to the utmost.

3.6.3 The WTO BTA Reference Paper
3.6.3.1 Introduction
Aside from market access and national treatment commitments made by countries in the BTA,
participating members determined that effective market access for telecommunication service
suppliers might be restricted due to domestic monopolies and governmental measures and policies
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not regulated by the GATS.320 As such, in 1996 the NGBT developed a "Reference Paper on Basic
Telecommunications."321 The Reference Paper includes regulatory principles on competitive
safeguards, commitments related to interconnection rights, universal service obligations, public
availability of licensing criteria, commitments for independent regulators, and allocation of scarce
resources.322

During the conclusion of the basic telecommunication services negotiations in 1996, some 67 out
of the 69 countries indicated that they would commit to regulatory disciplines contained in the
Reference Paper.323 The Reference Paper signatories have since increased to 82 members.324

3.6.3.2 Description of the Reference Paper Negotiation Process
In 1992, talks on a Telecommunications Reference Paper began as an informal discussion on
extending basic telecommunications negotiations beyond the UR. In 1993 the Group of
Negotiations on Services ("GNS") charged an informal group with conducting consultations on
the idea of an extension of negotiations among interested participants' trade telecoms officials.325

To encourage negotiating parties to reach an agreement on an extension of the negotiating period
beyond the UR, the informal group decided to develop a "common understanding on the services
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and issues [basic telecommunications services] that would be subject to negotiations" after the UR.
At the end of the UR, this informal group came up with a draft list of regulatory issues, referred to
as a "shopping list," that could form the basis of the post-UR basic telecommunication services
discussions and negotiations.326

When the NGBT began to meet after the UR was concluded in April 1994 and early 1995, the
discussions included regulatory issues on basic telecommunication services along with the market
access and national treatment negotiations.327 In July 1995 negotiating participants started to
submit their initial market access offers on basic telecommunication commitments. The US and
Japan were the first to attach proposals concerning regulatory issues to their market access
offers.328 At this time, the Quad countries started to hold consultations among themselves on how
to explore further the regulatory issues involved in basic telecommunication services access.329
Subsequently, the Quad realized that the consultations' success depended on involving other
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NGBT participants to ensure broader representation.330 Following this, the Quad countries began
to invite other NGBT participants that had tabled offers to participate in informal consultations.
Eventually, the consultative group increased to 12 participants and later expanded to 16.331
In December 1995, a proposed text entitled “Reference Paper” was presented as a non-paper by
the consultative group to a formal meeting of the NGBT.332 The Reference Paper included
regulatory issues proposed in the "shopping list." The Reference Paper was presented as a draft
serving as a "possible basis for focusing broader discussion" by the NGBT.333 The Reference Paper
was further discussed with input from other NGBT participants in early 1996.

In March 1996, the WTO Secretariat noted that the proposed Reference Paper was relatively clear,
and the revised Reference Paper was forwarded to all NGBT participants. The Reference Paper
was accepted, but the NGBT participants maintained that the Reference Paper would remain a
non-paper without binding force.334

3.6.3.3 Legal Status of the Reference Paper
As indicated, the Reference Paper is considered a “non-paper”. In other words, it is characterized
as a policy document without legal status.335 The Reference Paper was only to serve as a guide or
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model to help provide indicators for the scheduling of additional commitments.336 Parties were not
under any obligation to be bound by it except that the Reference Paper was referenced in their
services schedules.337 WTO members that accepted the Reference Paper only incorporated it into
their service schedules as an attachment.338

3.6.3.4 Analyses of the Reference Paper
In examining the significance of the Reference Paper, commentators have opined that the
Reference Paper is a significant step towards common regulatory principles in the WTO.339
Through its flexibility, the Reference Paper attempts to balance two objectives: international
market openness and national sovereignty.340 In other words, the Reference Paper attempts to
create free trade in telecommunications services and allows countries the flexibility to adopt
suitable regulations without imposing a set of strict regulations in the telecommunication sector.

One commentator has characterized the specific functions of the Reference Paper as divisible into
two categories. One is "to provide the requisite safeguards in domestic law for market access and
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foreign investment commitments to be truly effective." The other is "to anchor these safeguards in
the WTO system and hence make failure to implement them challengeable under the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding."341
However, the formulated Reference Paper’s principles' effectiveness has been questioned because
of their lack of clarity. Many of the principles have been described as "vaguely and/or are
incomplete."342 Due to this lack of precision, they have been challenging to enforce. As mentioned,
they are only indicative, not legally binding.

3.6.3.5 The Reference Paper as a CMA
The following section will analyze the Reference Paper and the way in which it serves as an
example of a CMA.
3.6.3.5.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible
The Reference Paper was a part of the BTA negotiation. Regulating policies helped to advance
liberalization in the telecommunication sector. One of the reasons gathering a ‘critical mass’ for
the Reference Paper was feasible was because WTO members were in the middle of negotiating
an agreement for the telecommunication sector. In addition, like previous CMAs the focus of the
Reference Paper negotiation was its trade benefit to both developed and developing countries.
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3.6.3.5.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure
or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
After the UR, the NGBT began negotiations on market access and national treatment, including
regulatory issues on basic telecommunication services.343 However, most countries only submitted
market access offers until US and Japan included basic telecommunication services regulatory
issues in their submitted offers.344 Afterwards, the Quad countries started an informal discussion
on these regulatory issues. Eventually 16 countries, the “group of 12” contributed to the initial
Reference Paper draft.345

Although it is not clear whether there is evidence of the use of threats from the US or any member
of the "group of 12" in the Reference Paper negotiation, the US and other Quad countries took up
the lead role from the Reference Paper 's initiation until its successful negotiation.346

3.6.3.5.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate institutional
power in the concerned trade sector
The Reference Paper satisfied the two criteria required to gather a high 'critical mass' that could
command the required legitimate institutional power for a CMA in the WTO. First, although there
was no express evidence of the largest players being involved in or dictating regulatory policies
in the global telecommunication sector, since the Reference Paper was a part of the negotiated
BTA the fact that significant trading partners were already involved in the BTA inevitably shaped
conclusion of the Reference Paper.
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Second, the Reference Paper negotiation was not limited to the largest players in the global
telecommunication sector. As indicated, the talks on basic telecommunications services
regulatory issues continued within the NGBT (among the Quad countries) after the UR. 347 After
the first NGBT meeting, a questionnaire was circulated among the participants.348 The purpose
of the questionnaire was to “explore each government's regulatory environment regarding the
supply of basic telecommunications networks and services. It is intended to facilitate an exchange
of information with reference to a common format”.349 In essence, the status of each governments’
regulatory environment was to be considered in the Reference Paper negotiation.
In addition, when the Quad countries realized that the success of their "informal consultation"
was dependent on expanding the talks to other countries in the NGBT, they extended discussions
to other WTO members until a consultative group of 16 was formed.350 The consultative group
consisted of both developed and developing countries representing every geographic region.351
Afterwards, a Reference Paper proposal was presented to the whole NGBT on behalf of the
consultative group. The essence of the circulation was for other WTO members to participate and
contribute to the submitted Reference Paper proposal.352 The negotiating history shows that the
Reference Paper was open, transparent, and encouraged participation from all interested WTO
members, and as a result, a majority of 67 out of the 69 members agreed to incorporate the
regulatory issues contained in the Reference Paper as additional commitments in their services’
schedules.
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How was a ‘critical mass’ threshold determined for the Reference Paper? Issues regarding
regulatory matters may not be quantifiable. However, as mentioned, the Reference Paper
negotiation was undertaken between 69 WTO members that were participants in the BTA
negotiation. Logically, 67 members out of the 69 members agreeing to incorporate the Reference
Paper represented an overwhelming majority with regards to the total number of participants
involved in the negotiation. In this case, the 67 members were the resulting ‘critical mass’ that
commanded the required institutional power for the Reference Paper negotiation and conferred
upon it legitimacy.

3.6.3.5.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
Like the WTO BTA, the Reference Paper’s benefits were to be applied on an MFN basis. However,
to prevent the effect of free riders outweighing the participants' benefits the Reference Paper did
not enter into force until a ‘critical mass’ of the WTO membership participated in it.353 In other
words, the respective NGBT participants’ scheduled additional commitments did not take effect
until a ‘critical mass’ of them had agreed to enter additional commitments concerning regulatory
principles to be applied in the telecommunications sector.
One of the reasons for the additional commitments ‘critical mass’ threshold introduced in this
instance was to avoid free-ridership. At the conclusion, 67 members out of 69 participants that
made Reference Paper commitments could be described as substantial enough, meeting the
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‘critical mass’ threshold to limit the issue of free-ridership in the Reference Paper negotiation and
implementation in the telecommunication sector.

3.6.4 The WTO Financial Services Agreement (FSA)
3.6.4.1 Introduction
The FSA is the second sector-specific agreement negotiated with respect to trade in services in the
WTO. The FSA is the Fifth Protocol to the GATS. It was concluded in December 1997 and entered
into force on 1 March 1999.354 The FSA came into force after 102 members, representing 98
percent of the WTO members involved in the world's banking services, insurance and securities,
joined the negotiations and made significant commitments.

355

The coverage of the FSA is

extensive. The term "financial services" includes insurance and insurance-related services and all
banking and other financial services.356

Like the BTA, the FSA is a service agreement negotiated by means of a 'critical mass' approach.
Thus, although countries were allowed certain exceptions to MFN under the GATS Article II
Exemptions, the FSA is otherwise subject to the MFN obligation.
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3.6.4.2 Description of the WTO FSA negotiation
Negotiations for an agreement on financial services in the WTO started during the UR. In the
1980s the US financial services industry had proposed a financial services agreement. This
proposal was put forward with the aim of a multilateral negotiation on the subject of financial
services within the framework of GATT 1947. These multilateral negotiations were foreseen to
involve a broad trade-off between goods and services commitments among negotiating parties that
would provide an opportunity for more market openings for financial services in emerging market
economies. In pursuit of this aim, the US government worked to include financial services on the
UR agenda.357

As in the case of the BTA, talks on financial services were included in the UR. However, the UR
did not produce much positive response to the negotiations on financial services partly because
countries' commitments and offers were limited.358 For instance, most emerging economies
refused to make commitments that would allow foreign financial firms to hold majority-ownership
positions in domestic financial services firms.359
In October 1993, the US submitted a proposal envisaging a “two-tier” approach under which it
would apply MFN to WTO members with respect to financial services at different levels. In the
first tier the US would grant unconditional MFN to the services of trading partners who opened

Key, “Financial Service”, supra note 354 at 958.
Ibid. For other reasons why an FSA was not concluded during the UR, see Sydney J. Key, “Financial Services in
the Uruguay Round and the WTO” (1997) Occasional Paper 54 1 at 24-32.
359
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their financial services market based on reciprocity.360 In the second-tier, participants with
restricted or limited market access would be granted conditional MFN. 361 The two-tier proposal
did not go far among negotiating parties. Most countries, particularly Japan and those in Asia, felt
attacked and threatened to downgrade their limited financial services offers if the US two-tier
approach was followed.362

As the UR drew to an end in December 1993 the US insisted that offers on the table, especially
those by Japan and other Asian countries, were not good enough to agree on unconditional MFN
for financial services in the UR.363 On 14 December 1993, the US also threatened to exclude any
agreement on financial services from the final UR final agreements altogether.364

Although the EU and US both wanted an FSA with a global commitment, and the EU agreed with
the US on the insufficiency of commitments from other participants, the EU was particularly
concerned about getting an FSA regardless of some members' weak commitments. At the same
time, the US was interested in an FSA with substantial commitments from principal members and
unwilling to allow emerging economies to become free riders.365

Towards the end of the UR negotiations the participating countries agreed that the GATS should
be concluded while the financial services negotiations were extended until 20 June 1995 with the
existing offers kept in place. A Decision on Financial Services was then drafted and attached to
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the results of the UR. 366 Members were allowed to modify, alter or withdraw any of their listed
commitments up to the deadline.367

In addition, like in the BTA negotiations, a standstill provision was adopted. The Ministerial
Decision on Financial Services suspended all listed MFN exemptions concerning financial services
that were made conditional upon the level of commitments undertaken by other participants until
the 20 June 1995 deadline.368

3.6.4.3 Post-UR FSA Negotiation
Negotiations on financial services began again after the UR. During that period, WTO members
started to reconsider and improve their commitments and some of them narrowed or withdrew
their MFN exemptions.369 Towards the extension deadline, the US insisted that the market access
commitments of some countries were still inadequate. In less than 24 hours to the deadline, US
announced that it would impose a reservation on the MFN principle. 370 The US applied an MFN
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exemption based on reciprocity since other countries did not improve their offers and
commitments.371 The US was disappointed with some developing country offers. For example,
major participant countries in the financial services sectors including Brazil and other Asian and
Latin American countries, were reluctant to commit adequately.372 Singapore, the Philippines, and
India were looking towards cross-sectoral negotiations too.373 In essence, most countries made
inadequate offers.

treatment for new entrants and new activities. Therefore, on 1 July, the US would not have an MFN obligation that
covered new activities in banking, securities, insurance, fund management, and other financial services.” WTO,
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The US decision to limit MFN application was a surprise to all other participants who expected a
deal to be struck.374 It was the first time the US had stepped back from a trade negotiation, and it
was the first time a WTO trade negotiation was going to be completed without US’s full backing.375

The EU proposed a negotiating extension of the deadline for 30 days until 28 July 1995 in a bid to
preserve the existing commitments made by other countries after the 1995 deadline lapsed.376
However, the US stated that its position would not change within the proposed 30-day interval.377
Between the June deadline and the proposed four-week extension, the EU began to encourage the
US, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries to improve on their market-access offers so that
a deal could be reached by the July 1995 deadline. As a result, after bilateral discussions between
the EU and the Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, these countries agreed to be a part of the
EU interim agreement proposal.378

With the backing of 30 countries in July 1995 the WTO Secretariat submitted a proposal for an
interim agreement on financial services to the Committee on Trade in Financial Services.379 The
Secretariat’s proposal was adopted by the Committee on Trade in Financial Services as an interim
agreement annexed as a ‘Second Protocol’ to the GATS.380 The interim agreement was to be
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implemented for an initial period up to 1 November 1997, with negotiations envisaged being
reopened afterwards.
The Second Protocol annexed the participating members’ Schedules of Commitments and Lists of
Article II Exemptions concerning financial services as of April 1995. The participating members’
Schedule of Specific Commitments and the Exemptions from Article II lists concerning financial
services annexed to the Second Protocol replaced the participating members' existing sections of
the Schedule of Specific Commitments and the List of Article II Exemptions.381 As a result of
these moves, a Decision on Commitments in Financial Services was agreed to that opened a 60day period starting 1 August 1996 for participating governments that had listed Scheduled
Commitments to supplement or modify their schedules of Article II exemptions.382

In this way, the financial services talks were rekindled in 1997. This time, the negotiating
participants aimed to achieve a final agreement on financial services by December 1997.383 The
US itself was willing to adopt more substantial commitments. On 12 December 1997, the US
circulated a paper containing a “revised conditional offer” among the WTO members.384 The US
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offered to withdraw its limitation for new entrants and expand existing activities and the conduct
of new activities among foreign financial firms in the US market. In addition, the US promised to
table a final offer based on its conditional offer if other countries would do the same. It would
seem that the US conditional offer incentivized other countries in that direction because 15
countries tabled new offers or improved on their offers the same day the US conditional offer was
circulated.385
The negotiations on financial services were finally concluded on the same day. 386 The concluded
FSA was to remain open for government acceptance until January 1999 and, in the end, garnered
commitments from 102 WTO members.

Apart from the US and EU's immense contribution to the initiation and conclusion of the
negotiations in this instance, one of the identified reasons for the eventual success of the
negotiations of the FSA was the Asian commercial crisis that began in 1997. Global markets were
uncertain about the regulation and openness of the Asian financial services sector. To avoid future
crises of this sort, countries became more willing to negotiate a final FSA.387 In particular, Asian
governments believed that binding commitments on financial services in GATS that would allow
foreign direct investment was another way to reassure nervous markets and investors that they
were committed to long-term policy reform.388
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According to some scholars, the FSA's accomplishments are challenging to analyze because
restrictions on financial services are entrenched in domestic regulatory policies that cannot easily
be reduced or eliminated. However, Hufbauer opines that "The most significant contribution to
liberalization is bringing financial services within the WTO framework and applying and creating
the policy space for further liberalization." 389

3.6.4.4 The FSA as a CMA
How did the FSA come to be a CMA? Did the FSA meet the necessary criteria for a CMA? The
following section will attempt an answer to these questions.
3.6.4.4.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible
Like examples of the other CMAs already discussed, the FSA focused on liberalization in the WTO
financial service sector. The FSA was agreed upon to improve WTO members’ financial
infrastructure and the workings of their economies.390 The FSA’s coverage was broad and included
banking services, insurance, and other financial services. The opportunities evident in an FSA of
this type encouraged the possibility of a ‘critical mass’ for the FSA.
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3.6.4.4.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure
or other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
Again, the US was the “champion” country in the FSA negotiation. The US, through its financial
services industry, proposed an FSA during the UR.391 After the UR, US, with the help of the EU,
continued their leadership role in the FSA talks until the agreement came into force in 1998.392

When the US was not satisfied with limited market access offers from some major countries, it
indicated its dissatisfaction by conditioning its MFN exemptions on reciprocity if other countries
did not improve their offers and commitments.393 At that point, the EU, through the WTO
Secretariat, attempted to preserve existing commitments by proposing a deadline extension and
drafting an interim agreement.394

In addition, the US was not only a significant leader in the FSA negotiation, it was also the
“champion” that used the threat of market closure to new entrants in the financial services sector
and improved commitments on its side after the interim agreement ended to persuade other WTO
members to make significant financial services commitments.

When an interim agreement was concluded, the WTO DG referred to the interim agreement as a
"second best" option because "one major trading partner [US] could not offer non-discriminatory
market access for foreign financial services. 395 The DG added that he hoped the US would return
to the multilateral MFN framework when the interim FSA expired, if not earlier.396
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The purpose of the extension was to allow participating members improve on their offers and,
more importantly, for the WTO to gain more time to fully reinvolve the US in a final agreement.
After the interim agreement came to an end, the US proposed to withdraw its limitations and
improve its offers. The US’s improved offer also served as an incentive to other countries in
securing the final FSA.397
From this assessment, it is evident that there were “champion” countries at each stage of the FSA
negotiation willing to ensure other countries made substantial financial services commitments and
that a final agreement could be achieved.

3.6.4.4.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands institutional power in the
concerned trade sector
The FSA came into force after 95 percent of world trade in financial services in banking, insurance,
and securities joined the negotiations and made significant commitments.398 Throughout the FSA
negotiations the US and the EU continued to push for the participation of more WTO members in
the FSA talks. This move reveals the openness and inclusive nature of the FSA negotiation to every
interested WTO member, particularly significant trade partners in the financial services sector such
as ASEAN countries. Throughout the FSA negotiation process, there is no evidence that the
negotiation was at any point limited to a set of WTO members or if certain WTO members were
denied representation or access to necessary documents.
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At the 12 December 1997 meeting, the US noted, “…the set of commitments covered over 95
percent of world trade in financial services, with new and improved offers from 70 countries, both
developed and developing countries from all regions of the world. This was truly a global deal."399

When an agreement such as the FSA has a number of participants that accumulate over 95 percent
of world trade in a concerned sector from both developed and developing countries, it goes without
saying that the overwhelming 95 percent of participants provided the necessary ‘critical mass’ that
commanded legitimate institutional power in the WTO financial sector for the FSA.
How was the FSA ‘critical mass’ calculated? Like other WTO CMAs, the financial services
operations in question, including equal foreign equity participation, are predictable and
quantifiable. As a result, the US could calculate the required ‘critical mass’ for an FSA from the
participants' tabled offers and commitments.400

3.6.4.4.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
The issue of free-ridership is perhaps the most crucial point of consideration in a CMA
arrangement. As indicated, the assurance that WTO members that benefit without any form of
obligation in an agreement will not overshadow the participants’ benefits in a CMA is one of the
determinants for the suitability of a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method.
In the FSA, the US’s insistence in getting substantial commitments from WTO members with
major financial services market was one reason a 'critical mass' was achieved. The 'critical mass'
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threshold in a CMA substantially limits the issue of free-ridership. With a 95 percent ‘critical mass’
gathered for the FSA, the issues of free-ridership were reduced to a minimum.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the concept of the ‘critical mass’ negotiating method and its features
within the WTO. This chapter has also analyzed previous WTO CMAs including the ITA, the
BTA, the Reference Paper, and the FSA, by giving their historical breakdown vis a vis the
mentioned CMA characteristics with the aim of further elucidating the WTO’s ‘critical mass’
negotiating modality. With the successes of the previous CMAs, the pertinent question now is, to
what degree is the ‘critical mass’ approach suitable for present and future trade negotiations in the
WTO? Can a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method replace the WTO’s multilateral negotiating
methods in most or every trade agreement negotiation? Are there specific sectors where the critical
mass-based negotiating technique is more suitable? In an attempt to answer these questions,
Chapter 4 will supply a case study of ongoing WTO trade agreement negotiation on fisheries
subsidies and the feasibility of a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method in respect of it.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. 'CRITICAL MASS' IN WTO NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
4.1 Introduction
Fish is a major source of food, employment, and income for many countries, especially the
developing countries and LDCs.401 With the importance of fish to all countries for different
purposes, fishing activities have increased worldwide. Due to this increase, the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that global marine fishery resources have continued to
decline.402
The continuous depletion of marine resources has resulted in long-standing research on how best
to protect fish stocks and ensure sustainability. The WTO and other international organizations
(IOs) have been negotiating agreements that attempt to address the sustainability of fishery
resources now and in the future.
This chapter examines the feasibility of a ‘critical mass’ approach to ongoing negotiation over an
Agreement on Fishing Subsidies (AFS) in the WTO, why the WTO is an appropriate negotiating
forum for an AFS, and how productive the WTO AFS negotiations have been so far.
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4.2 What is Subsidy?
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), a part of the WTO
Agreement, defines a ‘subsidy’ as “a financial contribution by a government or public body, within
the territory of a Member," which confers a specific benefit to a domestic industry.403 This financial
contribution may come in different forms, including grants, loans, loan guarantees, tax credits, or
governments' fiscal incentives.404

In the fisheries sector, the means by which a WTO-member government may grant subsidies to its
fishing industry include tax exemptions, lowering of costs for boat construction and equipment,
fuel costs reduction, vessel buybacks, grants for research and development purposes and a range
of other incentives.

Although the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) currently
covers certain prohibited and actionable subsidies on goods, the effort to negotiate a sector-specific
agreement on fisheries subsidies aims to target the activity of fishing operations in the hope that
this will help to stem overfished stocks, overfishing and overcapacity, and illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing, thereby contributing to the recovery in the marine biomass.

4.3 Why is the WTO the right forum for AFS Negotiations?
The international community has always agreed that certain, if not most, fisheries subsidies
adversely affect fish stocks. IOs and NGOs have for a long time been addressing harmful fisheries
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subsidies. These IOs and NGOs include the FAO405, regional fisheries management organizations
(RFMOs)406 and Oceana.407
Although there is general agreement that fisheries subsidies have contributed to depleting fish
stocks, there has been a debate on the suitability of the WTO as a forum where talks on fisheries
subsidies disciplines should take place. Some commentators opine that the WTO is primarily a
trade-oriented organization and should not be saddled with addressing environmental issues.408
Nevertheless, while the WTO is not an environmental organization in the classic sense, it is
obligated to ensure environmental sustainability. The preamble of the WTO Agreement provides
that trade commitments should be undertaken "while allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
member’s respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development."409
In addition, the geographical reach of the WTO makes the organization a suitable platform to
negotiate disciplines on fisheries subsidies. The WTO has 164 member countries today, and with
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a number of these providing fisheries subsidies in various forms the WTO Agreement can serve
as a venue for negotiating a global agreement on fisheries subsidies disciplines.
The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO Agreement also makes it an appropriate platform
for fisheries subsidies rules. Most IOs and NGOs do not have a legally binding framework. As
such, their fisheries subsidies rules are not truly binding. Rules made under the aegis of the WTO
Agreement are binding. Hence disciplines to be negotiated on fisheries subsidies will be
enforceable.
Furthermore, the WTO Agreement has addressed subsidies in existing WTO arrangements. 410 As
such, the disciplines on fisheries subsidies would be consistent with the general regulatory aim of
limiting subsidization.411 The former WTO DG, Roberto Azevedo, has reiterated that although the
WTO is not a fisheries management organization, it is an appropriate forum for negotiating and
enforcing multilateral trade rules governing subsidies, including fisheries subsidies.412
Fisheries subsidies have also been regarded as trade-distorting practices. Fish is a source of
international trade. More than one-third of fish products are traded internationally every year.413
Fisheries subsidies adversely affect global access to fish by encouraging competition in the marine
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products sector.414 Most developing countries and LDCs are not able to compete with developed
countries that subsidize their fisheries, which causes competitive disadvantage and distorts free
and fair international trade.
All these points make the WTO a proper forum for the negotiation of an AFS.

4.4 Inadequacy of the ASCM vis-a-vis Fisheries Subsidies.
The text of the WTO ASCM has been criticized as ineffectively addressing fisheries subsidies.415
The limitations of the ASCM vis-a-vis fisheries subsidies disciplines were concisely put by the
WTO Secretariat as follows: “It was observed that fisheries differed from other sectors in that
[fisheries] was a renewable resource which was vulnerable to depletion if overexploited. Because
many fisheries were of interest to more than one country, subsidies in this sector could affect not
only markets but also access to the resource. Yet ASCM Agreement rules focused on the impact
of subsidies on markets, not on the damage to productive resources.”416
A scholar reiterates that the “[t]raditional view of the trade-distorting effects of subsidies misses
the point that such subsidies, in addition to having … direct competition-distorting effects… also
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have a significant adverse effect on the sustainability of the underlying resource being produced
(fish), which threatens the viability of all other Members' fishing industry."417

As a result of the ASCM’s inadequacies and the urgency of promoting environmental sustainability
in the fisheries sector, the WTO has been trying to negotiate new rules on fisheries subsidies for
over two decades.418

4.5 Description of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations
GATT/WTO disciplines have traditionally been concerned with government subsidies to the extent
that these distort trade or retard the development of domestic industries. However, with growing
consciousness of environmental depletion, particularly in the case of fish stocks, the WTO
membership under the auspices of the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) has formally pursued
discussions towards an AFS to curb government-bestowed subsidies for this purpose since the
Doha Round was launched in the early 2000s.

4.5.1 Pre-Doha Round Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines
In 1997 the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) began discussions about fisheries
subsidies. WTO members, including New Zealand and the US, tabled several papers on the adverse
effects of fisheries subsidies to the CTE and the WTO Secretariat.419
Alice V. Tipping, “A ‘Clean Sheet’ Approach to Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines”, The E15 Initiative, Strengthening
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At the 1999 Seattle MC a group of seven countries referred to as "Friends of Fish" submitted a
statement and presented several proposals on the need to prohibit and eliminate environmentally
damaging and trade-distorting subsidies in the fishing sector.420
At the 1999 MC, certain members like Korea, the EC, and Japan mentioned that not all subsidies
in the fisheries sectors have adverse effects and that other factors adversely affect the fisheries
sectors aside from subsidies.421 Korea and Japan also noted that because of the technicalities and
expertise involved, negotiations on fisheries subsidies disciplines were beyond the WTO’s ambit,
whose focus is on trade, and should properly be pursued instead in the FAO and RFMOs.422 As
explained in Chapter 2, the 1999 Seattle MC ended abruptly, and nascent talks on fisheries
subsidies in the WTO were also suspended.

4.5.2 Doha Round Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations
WTO members included talks on fisheries subsidies in the Doha Ministerial Declaration to
improve the WTO rules on subsidies and, in particular, fisheries subsidies.423 Paragraph 28 of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration states, "…In the context of these negotiations, participants shall also
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aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account
the importance of this sector to developing countries." 424 WTO members also agreed to address
trade and environment concerns as they relate to fisheries subsidies.425 The WTO NGR was
assigned to oversee the negotiation process.

4.5.3 Post-Doha Fisheries Subsidies Negotiation
Since 2001, negotiations on fisheries subsidies rules have continued, along the way encountering
a series of valleys and hills.426 At the 2005 Hong Kong MC, WTO members continued to negotiate
fisheries subsidy rules. The Hong Kong Declaration gave a specific mandate that the NGR should
“strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of
certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing”, with
appropriate S&DT provisions for developing countries and LDCs.427
The negotiations continued and in 2007 the NGR Chair released the first consolidated draft text of
prohibited fisheries subsidies, new disciplines for actionable subsidies, general exceptions and
S&DT provisions.428 There was also a 2008 “roadmap” draft on fisheries subsidies calling for
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inputs to a second draft.429 In April 2011 a Chair's report on the state of the negotiations on fisheries
subsidies was circulated among the WTO members.430 Despite drafts from the Chair, negotiations
fell through in 2011 alongside the collapse of other trade negotiations in the Doha Round.
WTO members resumed talks on fisheries subsidies again in the runup to the Nairobi MC in 2015.
Preparatory talks to the Nairobi MC included a paper put together by some WTO members
proposing a "recalibrated outcome" on fisheries subsidies.431 The proposals included prohibitions
on subsidies for illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and fishing of overfished
stocks.
At the 2015 Nairobi MC, WTO members were divided on specific proposals put forward. Some
countries opined that the proposals were too ambitious while others regarded them as
inadequate.432 A draft decision text on fisheries subsidies with special mention of transparency
was circulated among members by the Chair.433 In the end, division among WTO members
persisted and a consensus could not be achieved. Due to this, the NGR agreed that talks on fisheries
subsidies disciplines should continue after the Nairobi MC.434
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In September 2015, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on its 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development.435 The UNGA 2015 Resolution includes a Goal on Life below
Water contained in Art. 14.6 mandated as part of the U.N.’s Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG):
By 2020, [to] prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to
overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing and [to] refrain from introducing new such
subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential
treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part
of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation.436
The UN SDG Goal 14.6 mandate relied on WTO's previous and ongoing negotiations on fisheries
subsidies disciplines, particularly the DDA and the Hong Kong MC mandates.437

In 2016, WTO members moved again to deliberate on fisheries subsidies disciplines ahead of the
Buenos Aires MC in 2017. This time WTO members aimed to complete an AFS as a part of the
UN SDG to be achieved by 2020.
At the Buenos Aires MC WTO members agreed to further talks on fisheries subsidies “with a
view to adopting, by the MC in 2019, an agreement on comprehensive and effective disciplines
that prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing,
and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU-fishing recognizing that appropriate and
effective special and differential treatment for developing country Members and least
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developed country Members should be an integral part of these negotiations.”438 In sum, the
three main pillars of fisheries subsidies being considered for prohibition by the WTO are subsidies
1) for IUU fishing, 2) for the fishing of stocks that are already overfished, 3) that contribute to
overcapacity and overfishing.
So far, through the previous draft AFS Texts and the most recent draft AFS Text circulated on 30
June 2021 the WTO membership has been able to reach a point of convergence on some parts of
the projected AFS. WTO members have agreed on the AFS’ scope; technical assistance and
capacity building for developing countries and LDCs; notification and transparency obligations;
a committee or institutional set-up and dispute settlement arrangement.439 In addition, WTO
members have reached an agreement on what constitutes an IUU fishing, subsidy concerning
overstocked fishing, and subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity and how to
determine these harmful subsidies. 440

Some of these agreed provisions in the Chairs Text of 30 June 2021 will be examined in
subsequent sections. However, because the AFS negotiations are ongoing, it is impossible to
exhaustively cover such a “moving target”. Understandably, several parts of the Text to be
discussed are subject to change or alterations.
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4.5.4 Post- 2015 WTO AFS Negotiating Approach
Establishing prohibitions for fisheries subsidies in a projected WTO AFS has not followed any of
the negotiating methods employed in previous WTO trade agreements. This is because WTO
members have not been able to agree on the same rules on subsidies for subsidies specific to the
fisheries sector. In addition, in the case of fisheries subsidies the negotiation of rules banning
subsidies that contribute to IUU, overfished stock, and overfishing and overcapacity involve
different sets of scientific data available to different countries and consideration of various regional
and national fisheries management laws.
This section will attempt to profile some of the approaches adopted by the WTO members in
determining fisheries subsidy prohibitions in the three areas of concern mentioned above.

4.5.4.1 Prohibition of IUU Fishing
A focal point for fisheries subsidies disciplines is on subsidies for IUU fishing.441 It is reported
that IUU fishing approximately accounts for almost 30 percent of global fishing activity,
representing about 26 million tons of fish caught annually at a cost to the global economy of more
than $23 billion a year.442
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The composition of IUU is comprehensive.443 Generally, illegal fishing comprises fishing
activities carried out in breach of applicable domestic or international fishing regulations and
laws.444 Unreported fishing is comprised of fishing activities that are unreported or misreported to
the relevant fisheries authorities.445 Unregulated fishing comprises fishing activities that occur in
fisheries areas where no regulatory or conservation management exists or pertains to fishing
activities carried out by unregistered vessels.446
According to the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), IUU fishing “leads to the loss of both shortand long-term social and economic opportunities”.447 IUU fishing has contributed significantly to
the depletion of fish stocks because it contributes to inaccuracies in catch statistics.448 As a result
of the lack of proper tabulation and management, it is difficult to determine what fish species have
been overfished or almost fished into extinction.449
WTO members have proposed several ways to determine a subsidy contributing to IUU. In the
most recent Chair’s Draft Text it was proposed that the IUU subsidy prohibition should be
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determined by notification from a WTO member or an RFMO in compliance with relevant
international law.450 WTO members’ and RFMOs’ IUU determinations are to be made “based on
positive evidence and follows due process.”451
4.5.4.2 Prohibition of Overfished Stocks
According to the WTO, “… A stock generally is considered overfished when it is exploited beyond
an explicit limit set to ensure safe reproduction.”452 Overfished stocks occur when the biomass of
a fish stock is below mortality.453 In other words, overfished stocks are fish species that have been
over-exploited and are almost extinct. In most cases, overfishing is the primary cause of overfished
stocks.454
According to the Chair’s Text of 30 June 2021, overfished stocks occur when they are “recognized
as overfished by the coastal Member under whose jurisdiction the fishing is taking place or by a
relevant RFMO/A based on best scientific evidence available to it”.455 The conclusion that a stock
is overfished is to be determined based on the best evidence “available to” or “recognized by” the
Member.456
4.5.4.3 Prohibition of Overfishing and Overcapacity
The WTO explains overfishing of a stock as occurring "where the fishing effort is excessive in
relation to the stock's abundance and rate of reproduction, such that a reduction of the level of
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fishing would lead to an increase in the total catch”.457 Subsidies that contribute to overfishing are
also referred to as 'capacity enhancing subsidies.' On the other hand, "[o]vercapacity generally
refers to the ability of a fleet to fish at levels which exceed the sustainable catch level in a fishery
(for example, because of too many vessels and/or too many fishers)."458
According to the Chair’s Text of 30 June 2021, subsidies that contribute to overfishing and
overcapacity include subsidies to construction, acquisition, modernization, renovation, upgrading
of fishing vessels, subsidies to fuel costs, or subsidies covering operating losses of fishing or
fishing-related activities, amongst others.459 These subsidies allow fishing fleets to fish longer,
harder, and farther away than otherwise would be economically possible.460 For instance, subsidies
on vessel construction allow more vessels to be produced so that more vessels will be involved in
fishing, which will invariably contribute to overcapacity. Put differently, subsidies and incentives
that reduce vessel operation cost encourage an increase in the number of fleets available for fishing
which, in turn, puts more pressure on marine resources and leads to overfishing and compounds
overexploitation of fish stock in the long run.
In the case of subsidies that cause overfishing and overcapacity, countries have proposed a number
of qualitative calculations to determine when a fish is overstocked or overfished.461 The Chair’s
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Text of 30 June 2021 does not indicate how subsidies that cause overfishing and overcapacity will
be determined. However, it can be implied from the Text's totality that they will be determined by
relevant RFMO/A laws or the best scientific evidence available to WTO members.

4.6 Limitations to the Successful AFS Negotiation in the WTO
Despite failing to meet the 2020 negotiating deadline for a final text, WTO negotiations on an
AFS have continued with the aim of their conclusion by MC12, originally scheduled for summer
2020 in Nur-sultan, Kazakhstan but now postponed until November 30, 2021 in Geneva.462
However, as a result of certain sticking points WTO members have not been able to develop a
specific AFS text.463 Among these sticking points is the issue of S&DT in relation to an AFS.
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As explained, the notion that members differ in their development level has always been
recognized in the GATT/WTO and the international agreements negotiated under their auspices.
One controversial topic in the negotiations over a WTO AFS involves S&DT for developing
countries and LDCs in the WTO and how this principle would be honoured in a concluded
arrangement while preserving the overall objective of enhanced sustainability of the oceans.464

In acknowledging the difficulty of implementing S&DT in AFS negotiations, it has been reported
that, “Special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries has been a
particularly intractable sticking point."465 S&DT has afforded developing countries some latitude
in the WTO. However, most developed countries, especially the US, no longer conveniently
accept what is in their view such "systematically lop-sided arrangements" while developing
countries continue to view the S&DT provisions as a significant feature of WTO trade
negotiations.466

For instance, in 2019 India made a proposition advocating for flexibility and exemptions for
developing and LDCs from some of the provisions of the proposed AFS, especially in the area of
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prohibition of subsidies contributing to overfishing and overcapacity.467 Other countries,
especially the US, do not agree with such exemptions.468
The Chair’s Text of 11 May 2021 provided for S&DT for developing and LDCs with respect to
subsidies on overfished stocks and subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. Art.
5.5 of the Draft exempts LDCs from disciplines on “fishing or fishing related activities” while
developing countries are exempted from disciplines on “fishing or fishing related activities at sea
within their territorial sea.”469 However, in the Chair’s Text of 30 June 2021 exemption for
subsidies on overfished stocks and subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity for
developing countries has been restricted to those countries that can cumulatively establish that they
are “low income, resource-poor and [have fishing industries characterized by] livelihood
fishing.”470
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As noted by one scholar, "Fishers from developing countries may conjure up an image of small
boats and fishing villages dotted along the shore. But in WTO negotiations, it includes major
fishing powers such as China and India and their massive factory ships and fleets of large trawlers
competing (and out-competing) on the world's oceans with rivals from the developed
countries."471 The prospect of these countries being exempted or granted some flexibility from
large swaths of coverage encompassed in the AFS text has been said to be potentially
problematic.472
S&DT status, the diversity of interests in the WTO’s membership and several fisheries
management technicalities such as the measurement of depletion have been some of the obstacles
to the successful negotiation of an AFS within the WTO to date. At the time of writing, it remains
uncertain whether an AFS is within reach because of these thorny issues. Nevertheless, at the July
15, 2021 meeting, the WTO DG and NGR Chair, Ambassador Santiago Wills, expressed
optimism that an AFS may be concluded at MC12.473 The July 15 meeting had in attendance 104
trade ministers representing 128 WTO members. According to the WTO DG, the July 15 meeting
was the first time in 20 years a text-based draft was consensually agreed upon by all WTO
members present for an AFS negotiation.474
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4.7 A 'Critical Mass' Approach to the AFS
If an AFS is not agreed in the WTO’s current negotiating framework, some WTO members and
trade experts have placed hope instead on a plurilateral AFS that would extend its benefits to nonparticipants. According to a trade expert, “If multilateral progress remains elusive, plurilateral
efforts could bear more fruit.”475
First, it is noteworthy that, like the diverging opinions on the WTO JSIs, the proposed AFS is a
form of rule-making in the WTO. As indicated, rule-making or amendment in the WTO requires
a consensus among its members.476 However, assuming the consensus principle may be
sidestepped, how feasible is a successful plurilateral agreement (CMA) on fisheries subsidies in
the WTO? To determine the suitability of the ‘critical mass’ method in negotiating an AFS, the
four mentioned criteria of a CMA arrangement examined in Chapter 3 will be assessed.

4.7.1 Whether assembling a ‘critical mass’ is possible.
As indicated, negotiations in the WTO have always been about advancing trade liberalization. The
ASCM that regulates WTO subsidies is also focused on improving market access. On the other
hand, a WTO AFS aims to protect marine resources, establishing disciplines for subsidies that
cause unsustainable fish stocks. The ‘inherent gains’ from an AFS is not trade oriented. In this
sense, the problem structure underlying an AFS is different from the trade advancement that have
been the hallmark of many WTO agreements. As a result of the minimal trade gains involved,
there may be difficulty convincing a number of WTO members on why limitations in fisheries
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subsidies will be beneficial to all countries environmentally and promote trade in fish for WTO
members in the long run.

In addition, most LDCs and some developing countries mainly depend on subsidies to reduce costs
and catch more fish stock in order to sustain their population’s livelihoods. Hence, assembling a
‘critical mass’ may be a long shot for an AFS because most WTO members may be reluctant to
give up the immediate benefits of fishery subsidies for longer-term, ill-defined environmental
benefits.
4.7.2 Whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure or
other means to extract greater commitments from other WTO members.
Assuming gathering a ‘critical mass’ among the WTO members for an AFS is feasible, are other
CMA features present for the success of a CMA for an AFS?

It is noteworthy that the pattern of previous successfully concluded CMAs was that the Quad
countries, particularly the US and EU, initiated, participated and in some cases directed
negotiations, until the previous CMAs were concluded. In the ongoing WTO multilateral
negotiation for an AFS, there is no evidence of a WTO member intending to be the “champion”
country which is willing to steer the course of a ‘critical mass’ negotiating approach for an AFS.
The moving forces behind an AFS are environmental and oceans-based NGOs.477 These have a
varying relationship with the global fishing industry. The closest the AFS negotiations came to
having a leading country was in 2016 when the US and 12 WTO members attempted to launch a
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plurilateral agreement on fisheries subsidies.478 At that time it was not clear if the US intended to
seek a CMA in this sector as it only stated that it would negotiate with “like-minded” WTO
members to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies.479
In addition, there was a significant market and industry-led consensus in the US and other
developed countries about the benefit of disciplines being pursued in previous WTO CMAs. In the
current instance, however, the US appears to be non-committal about its role in the WTO.
Although it is a major seafood importer and consumer, there seems to be no strong industry voice
that has emerged in the US to support the negotiations which, if successful, would require at least
some economic actors to remove themselves from the market or develop expensive sustainable
alternatives such as fish farming. Furthermore, in 2021 the US new administration has stated its
intention to remain on the sidelines regarding any WTO trade agreements negotiation for some
time.480 With the US taking a back seat on trade agreement negotiations, the push for an AFS
CMA may dwindle.
If the US does not initiate the projected CMA for an AFS, it is pertinent that a significant global
fisheries subsidizer country should spearhead the negotiations. As mentioned, from the ongoing
AFS negotiations it is unclear if any of the major fisheries’ subsidizers intend to push for a critical
mass-based negotiating approach.
Assuming there is a “champion” country willing to lead the CMA for an AFS, will it have the
capability to compel or incentivize other WTO members to be a part of the required ‘critical mass’?
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Since the AFS is not about trade advancement, the answer perhaps may be in the negative. For
instance, if the EU decides to take up the leadership role for an AFS CMA, it is unclear how the
EU will use the threat of market closure or other means at its disposal to extract greater
commitments from other WTO members. Unlike previous CMAs where the threat of US market
access restrictions implied limitations for other WTO members in the sectors concerned, this same
threat may not be invocable in the AFS’ case. If the EU prohibits certain fisheries subsidies, the
prohibitions will only apply in its member states and other WTO members will still be able to
continue their subsidy activities without restraint. Hence, even the presence of a ‘willing
champion’ may not make the ‘critical mass’ negotiating method a suitable alternative for an AFS.
4.7.3 Whether the resulting critical mass is high and commands adequate institutional power
in the concerned trade sector
As mentioned in previous chapters, there are two criteria in gathering a ‘critical mass’ high enough
to command legitimate institutional power in a particular sector.
First, it is necessary to have the most prominent players in the sector join the CMA. As of 2019
the largest fisheries subsidizers are China, the US, the Republic of Korea, the EU and Japan.481
These five WTO members account for more than 58 percent of all global fisheries subsidies
amounting to USD 20.5 billion in terms of the dollar value of subsidies.482 With China holding on
to its developing country status, it might be difficult to have all these major fisheries subsidizers
agree on the same course in the form of a CMA arrangement for the WTO AFS.

481

China provides the highest amount of subsidies (capacity-enhancing) among nations (21% of the total), and then
the US ranks second (10%), followed by the Republic of Korea (9%) and the EU (11%) of global fisheries subsidies.
Sumaila also notes that “Asia, including China, is by far the greatest subsidising region (55% of the total), followed
by Europe (18% of the total), and North America (13% of the total).” U. Rashid Sumaila et al, “Updated estimates
and analysis of global fisheries subsidies” (2019) 109 Marine Policy 103695 1 at 2.
482
Ibid.

136
Second, there must be an overwhelming majority of WTO members to participate in the
negotiation. How can the high number of participants for a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method in
an AFS be determined? How will the critical mass threshold be calculated? Like other WTO
negotiations aiming to include every WTO member, a ‘critical mass’ negotiation for an AFS will
be open and transparent to every interested WTO member that wishes to join. It will also be
inclusive by considering the concerns of both developed, developing countries and LDCs.
However, since an AFS is about the environment and keeping marine resources safe and
sustainable it may be challenging to determine the WTO members necessary for a high 'critical
mass' that would command adequate institutional power for a CMA on fisheries subsidy for a
number of reasons.
4.7.3.1 Imprecise Determination of Necessary Participants for ‘Critical Mass’
One of the difficulties in determining the required institutional power in a CMA modality for
negotiating an AFS stems from imprecise determination of the necessary participants. Some
scholars have noted that one of the shortfalls of the 'critical mass' negotiating approach, especially
in achieving the required 'critical mass,' is that "When new rules are proposed to be negotiated on
certain issues it would be extremely difficult to draw the line between countries that are relevant
or not."483 In other words, a CMA could exempt some countries for which a particular sector is
significant in its economy, but the country itself is too small to be relevant to the negotiations at
the global level.484
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For instance, although Senegal is categorized as an LDC in the WTO; the country is not one of the
significant fisheries subsidizers. At the same time, it is a major exporter of fish. Some time ago,
Senegal's fisheries subsidies encouraged an increase in export capacity that caused overfishing and
IUU fishing, eventually resulting in severe depletion of its marine resources.485 Under the current
negotiating text for an AFS, Senegal would ordinarily not be regarded as a significant participant
for CMA purposes. However, it is undeniable that Senegal's fisheries activities affect its marine
resources and those of other countries.486

4.7.3.2 Fish as a Common Resource
A second challenge in determining the necessary ‘critical’ mass threshold that would command
the required institutional power in a CMA arrangement for an AFS is the idea of fisheries as a
common resource. Fisheries are common heritage and, in most instances, not subject to national
jurisdiction until caught.487 Unlike tangible trade sectors like IT where the necessary critical mass
of the world trade in the IT sector can be easily determined, it is difficult to establish responsibility
for a fish stock until the fish in question are caught. As a result, until a country engages in fishing
activities it may be impossible to foresee which countries would be essential to form a part of the
'critical mass' to negotiate a CMA on fisheries subsidies aside from known major fisheries
subsidizing countries.
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4.7.4 Whether the issue of free ridership is non-consequential
In the event a 'critical mass' is achieved for a CMA on fisheries subsidies, the problem of freeridership also becomes acute since other countries will benefit from the agreement without making
any commitments of their own.

First, in cases where all other major WTO fishery subsidizers negotiate a critical mass-structured
AFS except China, such an agreement will be affected by free-ridership that may undermine the
efficiency and sustainability aim of an AFS. According to Hufbauer, "The prospect of free-riders
the size of Brazil, India, or China is enough to suffocate most plurilateral agreements [AFS] in the
crib."488

If China and other major fisheries subsidizers agree to an AFS, removing fisheries subsidies
without a global commitment doing so may be difficult because those who agree to reduce their
subsidies could be disadvantaged by other parties that do not with the same access to the
resource.489 As explained, the ‘critical mass’ of countries negotiating such an agreement is suitable
for international agreements that can manage with a minimum of free riders.

In addition, most fish species are shared stocks, including transboundary stocks, that is, fish species
moving from the high seas and through different Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); straddling
stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, that is, fish stocks that are found both within the coastal
country or within a country’s EEZ and the adjacent high seas.490 An increasing volume of the
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global catch comes from these shared stocks, and this diversity of jurisdiction further points to the
need to have an AFS involving every WTO member.491

Although fisheries subsidies are more pronounced in developed countries because of their large
fishing fleets in distant waters, subsidy programs to increase fishing capacity are found in both
developed and developing countries.492 If a CMA on fisheries subsidies is reached, it is unclear
how to determine that the few countries not obligated under a projected ‘critical mass’ negotiation
will not be tempted to engage in prohibited subsidization. If free riders continue to engage in
prohibited subsidization, then such fishing activities may undermine the protection of marine
resources as a key objective of an envisaged AFS.

Put another way, the impact of fisheries subsidies by the states not bound by a CMA AFS may be
minimal compared to heavy industrial fisheries subsidizers. However, this minimal contribution
to the problem does not presuppose that some fish types will not continue to be overfished, fished
in an IUU manner, or lead to overfishing and overcapacity under an AFS. Fishing fleets are mobile
and may simply decamp to a holdout jurisdiction that does not adhere to the AFS. These unchecked
acts may eventually result in the extinction of fish stocks and cause marine resources
unsustainability.

Also, LDCs rely heavily on fishing as a source of food and employment. This basic fact
presupposes that some form of rules should exist to ensure that the type of subsidies provided to
them for these purposes do not contribute to IUU fishing, overfishing and overcapacity, or increase
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overfished stock. Any country's fishing and fisheries activities may result in the depletion of fish
stocks and harm the environment.493
The argument that WTO countries can overlook free-riders' fishing activities once a ‘critical mass’
is achieved may not suffice for an AFS. A successful AFS should include obligations on all
countries without any exemption.494 Free-riders in an AFS - no matter how small - may undermine
the aim of the agreement because the issue of depletion of fish stocks and its resources is a global
issue that requires the commitment of all WTO members. The purpose is to protect global fish
stocks, not protecting a country from injury caused by another country.

4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the feasibility of the CMA arrangement to the ongoing WTO AFS
negotiation. To do so, the chapter has examined the concept of subsidy in the WTO and the
continuous efforts of 1Os and NGOs in combating subsidy activities that endanger marine
resources, particularly IUU fishing, fishing that contributes to overfishing and overcapacity and
overstocked fishing.
This chapter has also explored why the WTO is an appropriate forum for AFS negotiations,
including by means of a description of the WTO AFS negotiations so far. In addition, this chapter
analyses the ongoing WTO AFS vis a vis the CMA features. This chapter concluded that the
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‘critical mass’ approach may not be a viable negotiating method for a WTO AFS for a number of
reasons including the need for absolute obligations on all members to protect marine resources,
the failure to attract a willing champion country in the negotiations, and the diversity of interests
that make certain developing countries reluctant to agree.
As indicated, these are momentous times in the WTO. The WTO has not been able to successfully
negotiate an agreement since the Doha Round, and as a result, the organization is almost losing its
relevance in the global policy-making. The WTO AFS is at a crucial stage now and a successful
AFS negotiation might help to reinvigorate the WTO’s negotiating function. Despite the fact that
most of the indicia identified for a CMA-type AFS seem to be missing, the negotiations are moving
forward and – perhaps – coming to a conclusion, which would be a feather-in-the-cap for the WTO
as a whole.
According to the WTO DG, “A key WTO priority is therefore to conclude an agreement this year
[MC12] to protect our oceans by ending harmful fisheries subsidies”.495 In a subsequent interview,
the WTO DG adds that “We are on the cusp of forging an agreement [AFS] at the WTO that is
historic in more ways than one. It would show that members can come together and act on issues
of the global commons…We cannot -- simply cannot -- afford to miss this opportunity.”496
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Countries generally in a bid to constantly advance and grow their economy will continue to
negotiate trade agreements and rules among each other. The WTO Agreement and its predecessor,
the GATT 1947, have significantly ensured the smooth running of international trade after the
WWII. In light of the growing desire of cross-border trade negotiations and agreements signing,
and despite the challenges facing the WTO at the moment, especially in its negotiating arm, the
WTO remains a significant IO in the regulation of international trade among its members.
Before the WTO Agreement the GATT 1947 employed some traditional means of negotiation in
multilateral trade negotiation rounds. These negotiating methods included the ‘offer and request’,
‘linear method’ and the ‘formula’ approaches. During the UR WTO members consensually
introduced the single undertaking as a political tool employed at the end of the negotiations to tie
the results on different topics together and make trade-offs between them. With other agreements
and Ministerial Decisions, the WTO Agreement was concluded on the basis of a “single
undertaking” approach in the UR.
Following the UR, it was thought that single undertakings would be the way to proceed with future
WTO negotiations. However, as pointed out, the single undertaking achieved in 1994 was not
universal. There was much unfinished business.
Negotiations continued after that time on areas of select interest including financial services,
telecommunications services, and information technology. In each of these areas, agreement was
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subsequently achieved without the cross-cutting agreement that characterizes a single undertaking,
in the form of CMAs.
The different types of agreement concluded under the WTO Agreement and its predecessor, the
GATT 1947, emphasizes how the WTO Agreement could be characterized as an umbrella covering
a range of agreements and commitments, some of which are agreed bilaterally between pairs of
members, plurilaterally between groups of members, and others which are multilateral.
As indicated, the ‘critical mass’ approach examined in this thesis may offer a way forward for the
WTO’s negotiating arm. CMAs remain important in the WTO context because multilateral options
for agreement appear to have stalled. The indefinite suspension of the DDA in 2015 appears to
have marked the end of multilateral efforts at agreement among the entire membership, at least for
the time being. With 164 members, the WTO membership is simply too diverse to achieve an
agreement of the whole like the one achieved in 1994. A complicating factor is the presence of
many countries at different levels of development in the organization, and consequently, the
demand for S&DT. This result has led to alternative approaches to negotiating new WTO
agreements of a plurilateral type, which are either ‘closed’ in some degree, or alternatively, ‘open’.
CMAs appear to fall in the ‘plurilateral’ category, but they are different from the classic plurilateral
agreement, which is typically closed (i.e. extends its benefits to signatories only). In the case of a
CMA, the agreement is ‘open’ in the sense that its benefits are available to all WTO members
regardless of whether they sign on or not.
An exhaustive list of the criteria necessary for a CMA is elusive. However, the concept of ‘critical
mass’ as a negotiating approach entails more consideration than the gathering of a ‘critical mass’
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to obviate the issue of free-ridership. This thesis has tried to point out what some of the chief
characteristics of a CMA are:
• whether there is a critical mass of countries willing to commit on a given topic or in a specific
sector
• whether there is a “champion” country willing to use the threat of market closure or other means
to extract greater commitments from other WTO members
• whether the resulting critical mass commands adequate institutional power in the concerned
sector
• whether free-ridership is inconsequential
This thesis examined each of these criteria as they were satisfied in the case of the WTO ITA, and
the BTA, the Reference Paper and the FSA. In each instance, a critical mass of countries was
achieved. The benefits accrued from each agreement were enough enticement to gather the
required ‘critical mass’ of participants. In addition, the role of the US, and to a lesser extent the
EC/EU, was noted in satisfying the necessity of a “champion country”. In each instance the critical
mass appeared to command the adequate institutional power in the concerned sector. In addition,
the specific sectors were quantifiable, and hence there was the possibility of calculating and
determining the necessary institutional power.
Finally, it appeared that, for various reasons, the problem of free-ridership in each instance was
inconsequential. The problem of free-ridership did not constitute an intractable barrier to the
agreements since the necessary ‘critical mass’ of participants required were determinable and
quantifiable. In addition, each of these agreements eventually garnered the ‘critical mass’ that were
envisaged. Consequently, the idea that someone was “getting something for nothing” did not play
a prominent role in the previous CMAs. There was also little sense that agreeing to the disciplines
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in question prevented some countries from enjoying a resource that would be left to other nonsignatories to exploit as it is the case in a projected CMA-type arrangement for an AFS negotiation.
Another benefit of the ‘critical mass’ negotiation method is that the level of S&DT is not a major
problem. In the ITA, the BTA, the Reference Paper and the FSA S&DT was not a bone of
contention because developing countries involved had incentives to lower or abolish tariffs on
information technology products, or because they provide few financial services or telephony. An
alternative explanation could be that they agreed to these CMAs because they saw inherent
advantages to financial service discipline for their reputations or to the liberalization of their
national telecoms markets. Hence, even without the promise of reciprocal market access there were
significant domestic forces and advantages that worked to ensure developing countries would
agree to CMAs. In essence, S&DT was not a roadblock.
The successes of the existing WTO CMAs suggest that a CMA-type arrangement could continue
to be a way forward in ongoing WTO negotiations depending on the issue area involved. Previous
CMA arrangements point out how a CMA-type approach to ongoing fisheries subsidies
negotiations might unfold in the WTO.
The current crisis in global fisheries is generally well-known. Subsidies given by WTO member
governments in various forms have contributed to the current situation. Existing WTO rules on
subsidies are inadequate to deal with subsidization that may have long lasting or permanent
impacts on the marine biomass. As a result, a WTO AFS has been envisaged for the last two
decades and has assumed a new urgency under the U.N. SDG.
One option might be to use a CMA for the purposes of negotiating the AFS. Yet, as seen, the
‘problem structure’ of fisheries subsidies and other criteria for a successful CMA do not appear to
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be present in the case of a projected AFS. The first barrier to an CMA type for fisheries subsidies
in the WTO was revealed by the difficulty of assembling a critical mass. There is no clear idea of
the immediate trade benefit to be enjoyed from an AFS, and in any event, the potential advantages
from such an agreement are projected in the distant future and speculative. They will arise when
the global marine biomass recovers. Major countries – principally developing countries and LDCs
– have not agreed to the current AFS text or are seeking broad exemptions in the form of S&DT
that would eviscerate the agreement’s effectiveness. Many developing countries and LDCs use
fish resources to feed their populations. If they are to agree to an AFS, some alternative would
have to be found to replace this food source. Consequently, it may be challenging to gather a
‘critical mass’ among WTO members, particularly, the developing countries and LDCs since there
is no immediate economic or trade benefit from the proposed AFS.
Another barrier to a ‘critical mass’ AFS in the WTO is the apparent lack of a “champion” country
seeking to push the negotiations and ready to use its heft to ensure a deal gets concluded. The
analysis in early chapters revealed that in almost any CMA under the WTO’s aegis to date the US
has played a significant role in assembling the critical mass through the broadcast of its own
commitments and then using the threat of their revocation to compel more favourable concessions
from other countries.
There is the further point that no WTO member, apart perhaps from the EU, has stepped forward
to fill-in where the US has stepped away, threatening to use closure of its markets to foreign marine
products to force countries to adhere to an agreement. Without its critical championing of these
disciplines, they are unlikely to succeed. Even with a willing “champion”, as indicated in chapter
4, it is unclear how the “champion” could use the threat of their revocation or other means to
compel substantial commitments from other WTO members in the AFS case.
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There is also the difficulty of deciding the required institutional power in a CMA type of AFS
because of the imprecise determination of the necessary ‘critical mass’. Fish are not subject to
jurisdiction until they are caught. Thus, countries whose subsidies causes IUU fishing, contributes
to overfishing or overcapacity and encouraged fishing of overfished stocks may not be determined
until the fishing activity has taken place. Additionally, fish are common resources and controlled
and managed fishing activities of some countries does not deter other countries from engaging in
activities that are harmful to the marine resources. Accordingly, defining the adequate institutional
power for a ‘critical mass’ AFS in the WTO may be an insurmountable task.
The AFS problem structure is such that free-ridership might well be extensive and difficult.
Disciplines on fisheries subsidies involve countries encouraging economic operators to withdraw
from an activity – fishing – which has immediate economic consequences. Second, some fish
stocks are shared, transboundary or migratory, making the issue of free-ridership very difficult to
address unless all countries universally abstain.
A CMA-type AFS would effectively prevent some countries (chiefly signatories) from accessing
a resource in the form of the marine biomass which other non-signatories would be left to exploit.
As indicated in the thesis, this would be a significant loophole in the projected agreement, only
offset perhaps to some extent by the possibility of using continuing exploitation and depletion to
shame non-signatories who continue to subsidize and who could be labelled ‘culprits’ in worsening
of the depletion of global fishing stocks.
The projected WTO AFS assessed in this thesis has shown that a CMA arrangement may not be
an option for negotiation even after a ‘critical mass’ is gathered. There is a need for the mentioned
CMA features to be affirmed cumulatively for a ‘critical mass’ approach to be a suitable alternative
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to the WTO’s traditional multilateral negotiating modalities. Hence, the ‘critical mass’ approach
may not be viable alternative for all present and future WTO agreement negotiation. In the end,
the possibility of a ‘critical mass’ negotiating method in the WTO should be considered on a caseby-case basis.
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APPENDIX
Negotiation Group of Rules

TN/RL/W/276/Rev.1
30 June 2021

NEGOTIATING GROUP ON RULES – FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
REVISED DRAFT CONSOLIDATED CHAIR TEXT
Note: This document is without prejudice to any Members' positions or views, whether or not
reflected herein.
ARTICLE 1: SCOPE

1.1 This [Instrument] applies to subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement that are specific within the meaning of Article 2 of that Agreement, to marine wild
capture fishing and fishing related activities at sea.1, 2

1.2 [Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, this [Instrument] also applies to fuel subsidies
to fishing and fishing related activities at sea that are not specific within the meaning of Article
2 of the SCM Agreement.]

ARTICLE 2: DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this [Instrument]:

(a) "fish" means all species of living marine resources, whether processed or not;

(b) "fishing" means searching for, attracting, locating, catching, taking or
harvesting fish or any activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the
attracting, locating, catching, taking or harvesting of fish;

(c) "fishing related activities" means any operation in support of, or in preparation
for, fishing, including the landing, packaging, processing, transshipping or
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transporting of fish that have not been previously landed at a port, as well as
the provisioning of personnel, fuel, gear and other supplies at sea;

(d) "vessel" means any vessel, ship of another type or boat used for, equipped to
be used for, or intended to be used for, fishing or fishing related activities;
(e) "operator" means the owner of the vessel, or any person on board, who is in
charge of or directs or controls the vessel.

ARTICLE 3: PROHIBITION ON SUBSIDIES TO
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING3
3.1 No Member shall grant or maintain any subsidy to a vessel or operator4 engaged in illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

3.2 For purposes of Article 3.1, a vessel or operator shall be considered to be engaged in IUU
fishing if an affirmative determination thereof is made by any of the following5, 6:
(a) a coastal Member, for activities in waters under its jurisdiction; or

(b) a flag State Member, for activities by vessels flying its flag; or
(c) a relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organization or Arrangement
(RFMO/A), in accordance with the rules and procedures of the RFMO/A and
relevant international law, in areas and for species under its competence.

3.3
(a) An affirmative determination7 under Article 3.2 refers to the final finding by a
Member and/or the final listing by an RFMO/A that a vessel or operator has
engaged in IUU fishing.

(b) [The prohibition under Article 3.1 shall apply where the determination under
Article 3.2(a) is based on positive evidence and follows due process.]
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(c) [For the purpose of subparagraph (b), the coastal Member shall promptly
notify the flag State Member and, if known, the subsidizing Member, of the
initiation of an IUU fishing investigation [, and shall provide an opportunity
to the flag State and subsidizing Member to submit information to be taken
into account in the determination].]

3.4 The subsidizing Member may take into account the nature, gravity and repetition of IUU
fishing committed by a vessel or operator when setting the duration of application of the
prohibition in Article 3.1. In any case, the prohibition in Article 3.1 shall apply as long as the
sanction8 resulting from a determination triggering the prohibition remains in force, or as long
as the vessel or operator is listed as engaged in IUU fishing, whichever is the longer.
3.5 Where a port State Member notifies a subsidizing Member that it has clear grounds to believe
that a vessel in one of its ports has engaged in IUU fishing, the subsidizing Member shall give due
regard to the information received and take such actions in respect of its subsidies as it deems
appropriate.

3.6 Each Member shall have laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures in place to ensure
that subsidies referred to in Article 3.1, including such subsidies existing at the entry into force of
this [Instrument], are not granted or maintained.

3.7 Each Member shall notify to the [Committee] its laws, regulations and/or administrative
procedures referred to in Article 3.6. This notification shall be made no later than the entry into
force of this [Instrument]. Each Member shall promptly notify any subsequent amendments to its
relevant laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures.

3.8 [For a period of [2] years from the date of entry into force of this [Instrument], subsidies granted
or maintained by developing country Members, including least-developed country (LDC)
Members, for low income, resource-poor and livelihood fishing or fishing related activities up to
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12 nautical miles measured from the baselines shall be exempt from actions based on Articles 3.1
and 10 of this [Instrument].]

ARTICLE 4: PROHIBITION ON SUBSIDIES CONCERNING OVERFISHED STOCKS

4.1 No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies for fishing or fishing related activities regarding
an overfished stock.

4.2 For the purpose of this Article, a fish stock is overfished if it is recognized as overfished by
the coastal Member under whose jurisdiction the fishing is taking place or by a relevant RFMO/A
in areas and for species under its competence based on best scientific evidence available to it.

4.3 Notwithstanding Article 4.1, a Member may grant or maintain subsidies referred to in Article
4.1 if such subsidies [and/or measures] are implemented to promote the rebuilding of the stock to
a biologically sustainable level.9

4.4 [For a period of [2] years from the date of entry into force of this [Instrument], subsidies
granted or maintained by developing country Members, including LDC Members, for low income,
resource-poor and livelihood fishing or fishing related activities up to 12 nautical miles measured
from the baselines shall be exempt from actions based on Articles 4.1 and 10 of this [Instrument].]

ARTICLE 5: PROHIBITION ON SUBSIDIES CONCERNING
OVERCAPACITY AND OVERFISHING

5.1 No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies to fishing or fishing related activities that
contribute to overcapacity or overfishing. For the purpose of this paragraph, subsidies that
contribute to overcapacity or overfishing include:
(a) subsidies to construction, acquisition, modernisation, renovation or
upgrading of vessels;
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(b) subsidies to the purchase of machines and equipment for vessels (including
fishing gear and engine, fish-processing machinery, fish-finding technology,
refrigerators, or machinery for sorting or cleaning fish);
(c) subsidies to the purchase/costs of fuel, ice, or bait;
(d) subsidies to costs of personnel, social charges, or insurance;
(e) income support of vessels or operators or the workers they employ;
(f) price support of fish caught;
(g) subsidies to at-sea support; and
(h) subsidies covering operating losses of vessels or fishing or fishing related
activities.
5.1.1 A subsidy is not inconsistent with Article 5.1 if the subsidizing Member demonstrates
that measures are implemented to maintain the stock or stocks in the relevant fishery or
fisheries at a biologically sustainable level.10
5.2
(a) No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies contingent upon, or tied to,
actual or anticipated fishing or fishing related activities in areas beyond the
subsidizing Member's jurisdiction (whether solely or as one of several other
conditions), including subsidies provided to support at-sea fish-processing
operations or facilities, such as for refrigerator fish cargo vessels, and
subsidies to support tankers that refuel fishing vessels at sea.11

(b) Subparagraph (a) shall not apply to the non-collection from operators or
vessels of government-to-government payments under agreements and other
arrangements with coastal Members for access to the surplus of the total
allowable catch of the living resources in waters under their jurisdiction,
provided that the requirements under Article 5.1.1 are met.]
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5.3 No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies provided to fishing or fishing related activities
outside of the jurisdiction of a coastal Member and outside the competence of a relevant
RFMO/A.

5.4 [No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies for a vessel not flying the flag of the
subsidizing Member.]
[ALT 1

5.5
(a) The prohibition under Article 5.1 shall not apply to subsidies granted or
maintained by LDC Members for fishing or fishing related activities.

(b) The prohibition under Article 5.1 shall not apply to subsidies granted or
maintained by developing country Members for fishing or fishing related
activities within their territorial sea.
(c) The prohibition under Article 5.1 shall apply to subsidies granted or
maintained by developing country Members, including LDC Members, for
fishing or fishing related activities within their EEZ and the area of
competence of RFMO/A if all the following criteria are met:
i. the Member's GNI per capita exceeds US$5,00012 (based on constant
2010 US dollars) for three consecutive years;
ii. the Member's share of the annual global marine capture fish
production exceeds 2% as per the most recent published FAO data;
iii. the Member engages in distant water fishing13; and
iv. the contribution from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing to the
Member's annual national GDP14 is less than 10% for the most recent
three consecutive years.]
[ALT 2
5.5
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(a) The prohibition under Article 5.1 shall not apply to subsidies granted or
maintained by LDC Members for fishing or fishing related activities.
(b) The prohibition under Article 5.1 shall not apply to subsidies granted or
maintained by developing country Members for low income, resource-poor
and livelihood fishing or fishing related activities up to 12 nautical miles
measured from the baselines.
(c) For subsidies other than those referred to in subparagraph (b), a developing
country Member may grant or maintain the subsidies referred to in Article
5.1 for fishing and fishing related activities within its EEZ and the area of
competence of a relevant RFMO/A for a maximum of [5] years after the
entry into force of this [Instrument]. A developing country Member
intending to invoke this provision shall inform the [Committee] in writing
before the date of entry into force of this [Instrument].
(d) If a developing country Member whose:

i.share of the annual global volume marine capture fish production does
not exceed [0.7%] as per the most recent published FAO data; and
ii.subsidies to fishing or fishing related activities at sea do not exceed
US$[25 million] annually
deems it necessary to apply subsidies referred to in subparagraph (c) beyond the [5]
years provided for in that subparagraph, it shall not later than one year before the expiry
of the applicable period enter into consultation with the [Committee], which will
determine whether an extension of this period is justified, after examining all the
relevant needs of the developing country Member in question. If the [Committee]
determines that the extension is justified, the developing country Member concerned
shall hold annual consultations with the [Committee] to determine the necessity of
maintaining the subsidies. If no such determination is made by the [Committee], the
developing country Member shall phase out the remaining subsidies prohibited under
Article 5.1 within two years from the end of the last authorized period.]
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ARTICLE 6: SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR LDC MEMBERS

6.1 [Provisions relating to LDC Members shall continue to apply for a transitional period of [X]
years after the entry into force of a decision of the UN General Assembly to exclude a Member
from the "Least Developed Countries" category.]

6.2 A Member shall exercise due restraint in raising matters involving an LDC Member and
solutions explored shall take into consideration the specific situation of the LDC Member
involved, if any.

ARTICLE 7: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING

[Targeted technical assistance and capacity building assistance to developing country
Members, including LDC Members and land-locked developing country Members shall be
provided for the purpose of implementation of the disciplines under this [Instrument]. In support
of this assistance, a voluntary WTO funding mechanism shall be established in cooperation with
relevant international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) and International Fund For Agricultural Development.]

ARTICLE 8: NOTIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY

8.1 Without prejudice to Article 25 of the SCM Agreement and in order to strengthen and enhance
notifications of fisheries subsidies, and to enable more effective surveillance of the
implementation of fisheries subsidies commitments, each Member shall

(a) provide the following information as part of its regular notification of
fisheries subsidies under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement15,16:

i. type or kind of fishing activity for which the subsidy is provided; and
ii. catch data by species in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided;
and
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(b) [to the extent possible,] provide the following information as part of its
regular notification of fisheries subsidies under Article 25 of the SCM
Agreement17:

i. status of the fish stocks in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided
(e.g. overfished, maximally sustainably fished, or underfished) and
whether such stocks are shared with any other Member18 or are managed
by an RFMO/A;
ii. conservation and management measures in place for the relevant fish
stock;
iii. name and identification number of the fishing vessel or vessels
benefitting from the subsidy; and
iv. fleet capacity in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided.

8.2

Each Member shall notify the [Committee] in writing on an annual basis of:

(a) any list of vessels and operators that it has determined as having been engaged in IUU
fishing; and

(b) a list of any fisheries access agreements in force with another government or
governmental authority, and such notification shall consist of the titles of the agreements
and a list of their parties.

8.3 A Member may request additional information from the notifying Member regarding the
notifications and information provided under paragraphs 1 and 2. The notifying Member shall
respond to that request as quickly as possible in writing and in a comprehensive manner. If a
Member considers that a notification or information under paragraphs 1 and 2 has not been
provided, the Member may bring the matter to the attention of such other Member or to the
[Committee].
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8.4
(a) A Member may only invoke Article 4.3, Article 5.1.1, or Article 5.5 in
respect of subsidies which it has notified to the [Committee] under Article 25
of the SCM Agreement and Article 8.1 of this [Instrument].

(b) In addition, a Member may only invoke Article 4.3 or Article 5.1.1 if the
Member has provided information called for in Articles 8.1(b)(i) and
8.1(b)(ii).

8.5 [Members shall notify to the [Committee] in writing, on an annual basis, of any RFMO/A to
which they are parties. This notification shall consist of at least, the text of the legal instrument
instituting that RFMO/A, the area and species under their competence, the information on the
status of the managed fish stocks, a description of the conservation and management measures,
the regime governing the adoption of IUU fishing determinations, and the updated lists of vessels
and/or operators that it has determined as having been engaged in IUU fishing. The [Secretariat to
the Committee] shall maintain a list of RFMO/A notified pursuant to this Article.]
ARTICLE 9: [INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS]

[9.1 There is hereby established a [Committee] composed of representatives from each of the
Members. The Committee shall elect its own Chair and shall meet not less than twice a year and
otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this [Instrument] at the request of any Member.
The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this [Instrument] or by the
Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the
operation of this [Instrument] or the furtherance of its objectives. The WTO Secretariat shall act
as the secretariat to the Committee.]

9.2 Each Member shall, within one year of the date of entry into force of this [Instrument], inform
the [Committee] of measures in existence or taken to ensure the implementation and administration
of this [Instrument], including the steps taken to implement prohibitions set out in Articles 3, 4
and 5. Each Member shall also inform the [Committee] of any changes to such measures thereafter.
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The [Committee] shall review annually the implementation and operation of this [Instrument],
taking into account the objectives thereof.

9.3 Each Member shall, within one year of the date of entry into force of this [Instrument], provide
to the [Committee] a description of its fisheries regime with references to its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures relevant to this [Instrument], and promptly inform the [Committee] of
any modifications thereafter. A Member may meet this obligation by providing to the [Committee]
an up-to-date electronic link to the Member's or other appropriate official web page that sets out
this information.

9.4 The [Committee] shall examine all information provided pursuant to Articles 3 and 8 and this
Article not less than every two years.

9.5 The [Committee] shall maintain close contact with the relevant international organizations in
the field of fisheries management, especially with FAO and relevant RFMO/As [with the objective
of exchanging best practices and providing for a better understanding about the procedures for
adopting IUU fishing determinations and evaluating the status of the fish stocks or fisheries
pursuant to the implementation and administration of this [Instrument]].

9.6 Not later than [X] after the date of entry into force of this [Instrument] and periodically
thereafter, the [Committee] shall review the operation of this [Instrument] with a view to making
all necessary modifications to improve the operation of this [Instrument], taking into account the
objectives thereof.
ARTICLE 10: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and Article 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures shall apply to consultations, the settlement of disputes, and remedies
under this [Instrument], except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

ARTICLE 11: FINAL PROVISIONS
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11.1 [Nothing in this [Instrument] shall be construed or applied in a manner which will affect the
rights of land-locked country Members under public international law.]

11.2 Members shall take special care and exercise due restraint when granting subsidies to fishing
or fishing related activities regarding stocks the status of which is unknown.
11.3 Except as provided in Articles 3 and 4, nothing in this [Instrument] shall prevent a Member
from granting a subsidy for disaster19 relief, provided that the subsidy is:limited to the relief of a
particular disaster;

(a) limited to the affected geographic area;

(b) time-limited; and

(c) in the case of reconstruction subsidies, limited to restoring the affected area, the affected
fishery, and/or the affected fleet up to [a sustainable level of fishing and/or fishing capacity as
established through a scientific-based assessment of the status of the fishery and in no case
beyond] its pre-disaster level.

11.4
(a) This [Instrument], including any findings, recommendations, and awards with
respect to this [Instrument], shall have no legal implications regarding
territorial claims or delimitation of maritime boundaries.

(b) A panel established pursuant to [Article 10 of this Instrument] shall not
entertain any claim that would require it to address any issues of territorial
claims or delimitation of maritime boundaries that is contested by a party or
third party.

Endnotes
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1
For greater certainty, aquaculture and inland fisheries are excluded from the scope of this
[Instrument].
2
For greater certainty, government-to-government payments under fisheries access agreements shall not
be deemed to be subsidies within the meaning of this [Instrument].
3
"Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing" refers to activities set out in paragraph 3 of the
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
adopted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2001.
4
For the purpose of Article 3, the term "operator" means the operator within the meaning of Article 2(e) at
the time of the IUU fishing infraction. For greater certainty, the prohibition on granting or maintaining subsidies to
operators engaged in IUU fishing applies to subsidies provided to fishing and fishing related activities at sea.
5
Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to obligate Members to initiate IUU fishing investigations or
make IUU fishing determinations.
6
This Article shall have no legal implications regarding the competence under other international
instruments of any of the listed entities to make an IUU fishing determination.
7
Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to delay, or affect the validity or enforceability of, an IUU
fishing determination.

8
Termination of sanctions is as provided for under the laws or procedures of the authority having made the
determination referred to in Article 3.2, including by way of, for example: re-issuance of a suspended license; full
prosecution of the matter; and delisting, forfeiture, sinking or scrapping of the vessel concerned.
9
For the purpose of this paragraph, a biologically sustainable level is the level determined by a coastal
Member having jurisdiction over the area where the fishing or fishing related activity is taking place, using
reference points such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY), or other reference points based on indicators such as
[level of depletion, or level of or trend in time series data on catch per unit effort, commensurate with the data
available for the fishery]; or by a relevant RFMO/A in areas and for species under its competence.

10 For the purpose of this paragraph, a biologically sustainable level is the level determined by a coastal
Member having jurisdiction over the area where the fishing or fishing related activity is taking place, using
reference points such as MSY, or other reference points based on indicators such as [level of depletion, or level of
or trend in time series data on catch per unit effort, commensurate with the data available for the fishery]; or by a
relevant RFMO/A in areas and for species under its competence.
11

With respect to Article 5.2(a), the mere fact that a subsidy is granted or maintained to vessels or operators
that may be engaged in fishing or fishing related activities in areas beyond the subsidizing Member's jurisdiction
shall not for that reason alone be considered a prohibited subsidy within the meaning of
Article 5.2(a).
12

US$5,000 (based on constant 2010 US dollars) as per published data of the World Bank.

13
A Member is deemed not to be engaged in distant water fishing if its operators or vessels normally fish
in FAO Major Fishing Area(s) that is(are) adjacent to the natural coastline of the flag State.
14

Based on the latest published data of the World Bank.

15

For the purpose of Article 8.1, Members shall provide this information in addition to all the information
required under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement and as stipulated in any questionnaire utilized by the SCM
Committee, for example G/SCM/6/Rev.1.
16

For developing country Members, including LDC Members, the notification of the additional
information in this subparagraph may be made every four years.
17

For developing country Members, including LDC Members, the notification of the additional
information in this subparagraph may be made every four years.
18
The term "shared stocks" refers to stocks that occur within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of two or
more coastal Members, or both within the EEZ and in an area beyond and adjacent to it.
19

For greater certainty, this provision does not apply to economic or financial crises.
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